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A B S T R A C T
The role of peripheral physiology in the experience of emotion has been debated since the 19th century fol-
lowing the seminal proposal by William James that somatic responses to stimuli determine subjective emotion.
Subsequent views have integrated the forebrain's ability to initiate, represent and simulate such physiological
events. Modern affective neuroscience envisions an interacting network of “bottom-up” and “top-down” sig-
naling in which the peripheral (PNS) and central nervous systems both receive and generate the experience of
emotion. “Feelings” serves as a term for the perception of these physical changes whether emanating from actual
somatic events or from the brain's representation of such. “Interoception” has come to represent the brain's
receipt and representation of these actual and “virtual” somatic changes that may or may not enter conscious
awareness but, nonetheless, influence feelings. Such information can originate from diverse sources including
endocrine, immune and gastrointestinal systems as well as the PNS. We here examine physiological feelings from
diverse perspectives including current and historical theories, evolution, neuroanatomy and physiology, de-
velopment, regulatory processes, pathology and linguistics.
Introduction
Conscious emotional experience is closely bound to changes in
bodily sensations. Indeed, if one accepts the notion that consciousness
is grounded in biological processes (Crick, 1994; Damasio, 1994;
Pinker, 2018), emotional experience must, by its nature, be
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physiological. However, the direction of causality and the specificity of
relationships between physiological processes and emotional experi-
ence have been topics of debate since at least the 19th century. This
review focuses on interaction between subjective emotional experience
and the body. Specifically, we address how emotional feelings are in-
formed by physiological processes that are detected by peripheral organ
‘interoceptors’, encoded and transmitted from the peripheral nervous
system (PNS), to be represented at specific levels of the central nervous
system (CNS). We additionally address how emotional experience may
encompass the prediction, as well as feedback, of physiological
changes, through efferent responses from CNS to PNS that change
bodily physiology as an obligatory component of an emotive response.
This work is undertaken as part of ‘The Human Affectome Project’,
an initiative organized in 2016 by a non-profit organization called
Neuroqualia. The project aims to produce a series of overarching re-
views that summarize current knowledge about affective neuroscience
and the language that we use to convey feelings and emotions. The
projects comprise twelve teams, organized into a task force with the
aim of developing a comprehensive and integrated model of affect to
serve as a common focal point for future affective research. To that end,
our team was specifically tasked to review neuroscience research on the
relationship between subjective experiences of emotion and associated
physiological processes. We were also asked to review the language that
people use to express feelings that relate to physiological processes and
consider whether or not feelings that people convey in language might
inform the way we approach neuroscience research on these topics. An
important reason to focus on the physiology of emotional experience
and expression along with consideration of emotional language is the
well-documented imprecision inherent in self-report instruments for
such experiences (Harmon-Jones et al., 2016; Mauss and Robinson,
2009). Moreover, emotion is a multi-component process hence it is
important to examine from different levels, including physiology,
which is complementary to self-reported experience and behavior.
A unifying theme of this review is that the subjective experience of
emotion is influenced, and often determined by CNS representations of
afferent sensory input from peripheral organs and tissues – con-
ventionally termed interoception (Craig, 2016; Critchley and Garfinkel,
2017; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). We strive to follow Damasio and
Carvalho's (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013) distinction between ‘emotion’
– an adaptive, patterned neural response akin to physiological drives
such as hunger and thirst, and ‘feeling’ – internal sensations resulting
from these patterned responses as well as from other interoceptive
sources. However, we also acknowledge models of emotion that en-
compass experiential, physiological and behavioral dimensions as well
as the notion of ‘construction’, in which conscious affect lies at a level
below labeled emotions built from cognitive representations of context,
physiology and prior experience (Barrett, 2017c). (Note that opera-
tional definitions are provided in Box 1 and nuanced distinctions are
further elaborated by the Affectome Project in the “Linguistics” section
of this review).
Three additional aspects of interoception are hypothesized. First,
CNS representations of interoceptive information need not reach the
level of conscious awareness in order to profoundly influence the sub-
jective phenomena of feelings and emotions (Wiens, 2005). Second, the
CNS efferent responses that target the sources of afferent input, as well
as the resulting re-afferent feedback, can contribute to the subjective
experience of emotion (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Third, inter-
oceptive feelings can be both generated and perceived within the CNS
(Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Damasio, 1996; Seth and Friston, 2016).
These latter two points extend the tight physiological definition of
interoception beyond afferent sensory input and representation to in-
ferential computational processes that ultimately support experience.
Thus, recent models of interoception and emotion incorporate Bayesian
concepts (e.g. predictive coding), wherein the brain makes sense of
dynamic changes in a wealth of viscerosensory information by pre-
dicting likely causes of those changes: prior interoceptive experiences
are deployed as predictions of probable interoceptive experience, to
yield ‘prediction errors’, i.e., the difference between an expected in-
ternal state and afferent interoceptive data (Barrett and Simmons,
2015; Paulus and Yu, 2012; Saxe and Houlihan, 2017; Seth and Friston,
2016). One remarkable corollary of this perspective is that, when pre-
diction errors are small, interoceptive experience may be generated
largely by what our brain expects to feel rather than by actual afferent
neural signals from the periphery (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Seth and
Friston, 2016). Also the ‘top-down’ efferent neural drive to the PNS to
change the internal bodily state supports ‘active inference’, whereby
prediction errors are minimized by changing the input (feedback) at
source. These counterintuitive possibilities capture the key function of
interoception in the maintenance of physiological homeostasis (Seth
and Friston, 2016). Thus, centrally-generated predictions of physiolo-
gical states are expressed in autonomic reflexes. Unpredicted inter-
oceptive inputs generate prediction errors, which trigger both emo-
tional feelings and homeostatic responses (Seth and Friston, 2016).
Although this review will not describe in detail the theoretical and
computational models of predictive coding, active inference or Baye-
sian analyses of the physiology of emotions, it is crucial to bear in mind
that the reality of perceived emotions (including their interoceptive
components) encompasses more than the direct representation of per-
ipheral states and includes central predictions of peripheral physiology.
Another important, but difficult distinction is between emotion and
mood (Beedie et al., 2005). Typically these are operationally dis-
tinguished by duration and sometimes by intensity or reactivity (Beedie
et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2016), but consensus regarding cutoffs on
any dimension is lacking. This review conceptualizes emotion as a
phasic response, yet recognizes its overlap with the enduring phe-
nomenon of mood (particularly when describing interoceptive influ-
ences of tonic or gradually changing physiological state including the
fluctuating hormonal milieu, pain, sickness and inflammation). Indeed,
mood states are perhaps the affective phenomena most strongly influ-
enced by interoception and are recognizably a powerful biasing factor
for the subjective experience and regulation of affective feelings in both
normal emotion (Ritchie et al., 2009; Sereno et al., 2015) and psy-
chopathology (Gilbert et al., 2013).
This review will not seek to provide an exhaustive account of the
physiology of emotion or the phenomenon of interoception. Instead, we
highlight a sample of important theories and discoveries with an ap-
preciation for their historical precedents and clinical relevance. The
following provides a brief overview:
Reductionist ‘peripheral’ theories of emotion, asserting that phy-
siological responses precede emotions (James, 1884; Lange, 1922), and
their rebuttal by ‘central’ theories asserting central determinants of
emotion specificity and nonspecific PNS responses as epiphenomena
(Bard, 1928; Cannon, 1928), established a scientific dialectic that per-
sists to this day. However, recent neuroscientific evidence describes
dynamic and often flexible interactions, wherein emotions generate
efferent influences on peripheral physiology from central representa-
tions (including predictive active inference) and are, in turn, shaped by
afferent information from the periphery (including prediction errors).
These later theories also accommodate critical contributions of cogni-
tive appraisals and psychosocial determinants in inferential predictive
representation of emotion.
The evolutionary importance of emotions and their function in
intra-specific communication was articulated in Darwin's prescient
work, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1872).
Recognition of the evolutionary importance of emotions has helped
drive the field of evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby, 2013).
Advances in human neuroscience have greatly informed our un-
derstanding of emotion with implications for all such emotion theories.
Functional neuroimaging, particularly functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), permits detailed examination of CNS representations of
emotion. Moreover, meta-analytic approaches to fMRI data continue to
highlight key commonalities underpinning emotional mechanisms
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across distinct studies (e.g. Phan et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2004; Yarkoni
et al., 2011). Although fMRI provides excellent spatial resolution, it
shows poor temporal resolution. Among other techniques for the study
of emotion and interoception, neural recording (scalp and intracranial
EEG; magnetoencephalography) using event related potentials (ERPs)
provides convergent information on the millisecond scale about timing
of relevant brain responses. ERPs are time domain measures which
reflect changes in neural activation in response to specific stimuli.
Frequency domain measures (i.e., neural oscillations at specific fre-
quencies) can also be extracted from scalp-recorded EEG signals that
may reflect important aspects of emotional processing, though thus far
these have been primarily investigated in the context of response to
rewarding stimuli (for review, see Glazer et al., 2018).
Modern studies of interoception as a discrete topic of neurocognitive
inquiry were presaged by decades of research on the influence of the
autonomic nervous system on emotion. Following influential reviews
(Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2002, 2016; Critchley, 2005), the study of
interoception in relation to normal emotion has blossomed (Barrett,
2017c; Craig, 2010; Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017; Kleckner et al.,
2017; Krautwurst et al., 2016; Strigo and Craig, 2016). Three very
different types of feelings clearly representative of those based on in-
teroception – nociception, disgust and empathy – will be discussed.
Abnormalities of interoception are now recognized to occupy a central
role in the conceptualization of addiction and other psychiatric dis-
orders (Gray and Critchley, 2007; Khalsa et al., 2018; Paulus and Stein,
2010; Paulus and Stewart, 2014; Paulus et al., 2009).
Peripheral systems that influence subjective feelings convey phy-
siological information to the CNS via interoceptive mechanisms oper-
ating at both conscious and unconscious levels. This is the case both for
classical stress systems in the HPA axis and sympathetic nervous system
as well as other neuroendocrine systems including gonadal steroids and
neuropeptides such as oxytocin. Interoceptive feelings are nowhere
more apparent than in the human reward system manifesting both as
“wanting” and “liking” (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015; Paulus and
Box 1
Operational, working definitions of terms frequently used throughout this review that roughly follow those of Damasio and Carvalho (2013).
Note that these definitions are influenced by what they seek to explain and they are not advanced as universal definitions. Additional terms are
defined in relevant sections.
Feeling
Sensations perceived as emanating from inside the body that may originate from afferent information from peripheral receptors (including
visceral, temperature and pain) that has been processed to varying degrees (e.g., in brainstem nuclei and thalamus), or that may originate from
central representations of such bodily sensations in the brain itself.
Emotion
A programmed neural response evolved to serve an adaptive function by mobilizing specific neural activity in both the brain and periphery
and by favoring certain behaviors. An emotional response can be evoked by, generate, or be shaped by specific feelings as well as by specific
exteroceptive stimuli, cognitions or cognitive processes.
Mood
A valenced, tonic, persisting state during which valence-congruent phasic feelings may repeatedly arise or emotional responses may be
evoked. Mood is distinguished from feelings and emotion by its duration whether or not it is tied to a specific stimulus.
Affective
Pertaining to a valenced feeling, mood or emotional response.
Afferent
A directional term referring to information flow, encoded as neural activity, from a more peripheral locus in the nervous system to a more
central locus. For example, movement, at each step or in total, from a sensory receptor through the peripheral nervous system, spinal cord and/
or brainstem nuclei and thalamus, to primary, unimodal and multimodal association cortices.
Efferent
A directional term referring to information flow from a more central locus in the nervous system to a more peripheral locus. For example,
movement in the opposite direction along the above afferent pathway.
Interoception
Receipt, by the brain, of afferent sensory input from peripheral organs, tissues and physiological processes, or receipt of information from
brain representations of such organs, tissues and processes by other regions of the brain. Interoception may be consciously perceived in which
case it is very similar to feeling. Interoception may also affect feelings or generate peripheral physiological changes by evoking efferent signals
below the level of consciousness.
Homeostasis
An optimum physiological state from which departures trigger automatic physiological and behavioral processes which seek to return
physiological values to those of that state. Emotions have been hypothesized to have evolved, in part, to favor behaviors that promote return to
homeostasis.
Emotion processing
Changes occurring in an emotional response once it has been evoked that may result from deliberate or automatic processes such as
cognitive attributions that diminish or augment response, intrinsic physiology (e.g., activation then dissipation of stress response), active
behavior (e.g., avoiding the evoking stimlus), etc.
Emotion regulation
A form of emotion processing, deliberate or automatic, that acts to augment or diminish the duration or intensity of an emotional response
to a more manageable level. Regulation may occur before (e.g., avoidance, cognitive preparation) or during an emotional response (e.g.,
suppression, reattribution). Regulation may also result from low-level neural processes such as habituation and extinction.
Emotional perception
The degree of and nature of awareness that an emotional response has been evoked including, for example, continua from unawareness
(alexithymia) to hyper-awareness, habitual biases toward one or the other end of a valence continuum.
Emotional experience
The subjective state when an emotional response has been evoked. May vary from unawareness to hyper-awareness of the ongoing re-
sponse, or may be a transformation of response (e.g., somatization).
(Note feelings and moods can also be processed, regulated, perceived and experienced albeit by mechanisms that may differ from those
directed toward an emotional response.)
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Stewart, 2014). Like the endocrine system, the immune system's influ-
ence on emotional experience may result from long-latency, tonic
processes, such as inflammation (Harrison et al., 2009). Another newly
appreciated influence on emotion is the gastrointestinal system with its
enteric nervous system and gut microbiota, where the vagus nerve is
proposed as a potential pathway through which the brain and the gut
may influences each other (Cryan and Dinan, 2012, 2015; Rook et al.,
2014).
The ability of peripheral physiology to influence emotion below the
level of conscious awareness raises the question of whether emotion can
be experienced or expressed with absent or attenuated consciousness.
This topic has been explored in the case of unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome and the minimally conscious state. Emotion in the dimin-
ished states of consciousness during sleep and dreaming are also con-
sidered.
Regulation of emotion is inseparable from the ability to regulate
physiological state. Both conscious and automatic emotion regulation is
heavily reliant upon perception of interoceptive feedback. The vagus
nerve represents one important conduit for afferent interoceptive in-
formation to flow from the viscera, via the brainstem, to the forebrain,
as well as for efferent emotion regulatory mechanisms to influence
visceral activity. Another key interoceptive afferent input to the CNS is
the lamina 1 spinothalamic tract with its A-delta and C-type fibers
(Craig, 2002, 2016). A key mechanism by which humans regulate
emotion is the ability to tolerate, via compensatory behaviors, ‘un-
healthy’ physiological and psychological states beyond their normative
range of values (McEwen and Wingfield, 2003). Adaptive physiological
regulation is put on hold to meet transient challenges. These allostatic
responses within stress systems allow humans to temporarily tolerate
abnormally elevated levels of physiological stress in support of con-
comitant emotive behaviors. However, when chronic, the emotional
(e.g. anxiety) and physiological adjustments increase ‘allostatic load’
undermining long-term physiological and emotional health (McEwen,
1998).
Dramatic changes in the ability and strategies for emotion regula-
tion occur across the lifespan. Notably, acquisition of basic emotion
regulatory skills are among the earliest milestones in normally devel-
oping infants and toddlers. Emotion regulatory skills continue to de-
velop into adolescence and early adulthood, paralleling brain changes,
e.g. myelination of frontal projections. Interoception plays an early and
sustained role in these processes, underpinning the subjective physio-
logical experience of distress that demands regulation, and commu-
nicating the amelioration of that distress that signals successful reg-
ulation and can facilitate learning (by negative reinforcement). A social
mechanism, overlooked until only recently – coherence of physiological
responses in close dyadic relationships – supports emotional regulation
of one or both members of the dyad, and directly facilitates emotion
regulatory learning via interoceptive feedback (e.g. in a parent–infant
dyad).
Human emotion regulation is aided by two primitive learning pro-
cesses – extinction and habituation – that we share with nearly the
entire animal kingdom. Arguably, these represent the neural foundation
upon which more advanced (e.g. cognitive) processes of human emo-
tion regulation are built (Delgado et al., 2008). These processes are
accompanied by brain plasticity, and here the emotional regulatory
function of sleep is gaining important recognition in affective neu-
roscience and psychiatry (Goldstein and Walker, 2014; Pace-Schott
et al., 2015a,b; Palmer and Alfano, 2017; Tempesta et al., 2017).
In psychopathology and neuropathologic syndromes, the normal
relationship between physiology and emotion is typically disrupted and
accompanied by altered interoception (Khalsa et al., 2018). A particu-
larly compelling example is somatization, in which abnormal inter-
oception can occur at multiple points in the pathway from peripheral
sense organs to central representation. In contrast, psychological ex-
perience may become uncoupled from the physiological/behavioral
expression of a specific emotion in neurologic disorders such as
pseudobulbar affect. Similarly, in parasomnias, dissociation between
different elements of full wakefulness sometimes allow emotional be-
haviors to be expressed automatically. Lastly, symptoms of neu-
ropsychiatric disorders can reflect the interoceptive awareness of an
abnormal physiological state (as in panic attack) or of a normal phy-
siological response (e.g., grief) activated under inappropriate circum-
stances (e.g., major depressive episode).
Interoception plays a key role in each of the above normal and
abnormal experiences of physiological emotion. The ways in which
these experiences are labeled and communicated verbally can also vary
dramatically among different languages and cultures. In the English
language, some expressions of physiological feelings are unambiguous
(hunger, thirst, pain, temperature). However some interoceptive feel-
ings are extremely subtle, their description may rely upon metaphor or
analogy (e.g., “butterflies in the stomach”), and many are difficult to
map onto specific physiological events. It is likely that some of these
reflect the constrained awareness and integration of bodily signals that
nevertheless influence feelings, emotions and moods (Craig, 2002,
2009; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). One goal of the Affectome Pro-
ject's linguistic approach is to identify how language may reveal ex-
periential feelings and associated physiological processes meriting fur-
ther study.
2. Theories of emotion and physiology
When asked to define emotions, most researchers will include
physiological terms. However, accounts disagree on the importance and
nature of physiological changes associated with different emotions.
Whether or not emotions are characterized by unique physiological
changes (i.e., emotion-specific physiological response patterns) has
been fervidly debated since the 19th century (e.g., James, 1884; Lange,
1922 vs. Bard, 1928; Cannon, 1928). Currently the predominant opi-
nion is that somatovisceral and central nervous responses associated
with an emotion serve to prepare situationally adaptive behavioral re-
sponses (e.g., Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Panksepp, 2000).
According to theorists endorsing the arousal concept (e.g., Duffy,
1972), emotion-specific response profiles do not exist. Instead, behavior
and related psychological processes are suggested to be based on a
unidimensional activation concept. Whereas it should be possible to
measure psychological activation (i.e., emotional arousal) by using any
single physiological variable (see, however, Duffy, 1972, for legitimate
exceptions [e.g., during voluntary suppression of activity in specific
muscles]), it would not be possible to draw qualitative inferences about
the kind of predominating emotion. However, correlations between
different psychophysiological measurements are often low or even
nonexistent (see Fahrenberg and Foerster, 1982; Stemmler, 1992), thus
questioning the arousal concept. Investigations of the specificity versus
aspecificity of autonomic correlates of particular emotions have a rich
history that is reviewed in detail in Section 5.
Other dimensionalists (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Bradley et al., 1992) do
not assume fine-grained emotion-specific physiological response pat-
terns either, but propose instead two (or three) strategic emotion di-
mensions (e.g., appetitive versus aversive action dispositions) that are
assumed to be closely linked with physiological responses. Commonly,
these emotion dimensions are related to activity in specific subcortical
networks (appetitive system: e.g., nucleus accumbens, mesolimbic do-
paminergic system; aversive system: e.g., amygdala; see also Davis,
1989; LeDoux, 2000). In addition, authors in this tradition admit the
existence of so-called tactical aspects of emotions that consider con-
textual conditions during goal pursuit. Both strategic and tactical as-
pects of emotions would be supported by dynamic physiological re-
sponse profiles well explained via the defense-cascade model (Bradley
and Lang, 2007). Similar thoughts are at the basis of theoretical models
proposed by Davidson (Davidson et al., 2000) and Gray (Gray and Mc
Naughton, 2000).
In contrast, authors in the tradition of basic emotions (e.g., Ekman,
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1992a) postulate the existence of a limited number of distinct emotions
that are characterized by specific (i.e., qualitatively different) central
nervous and somatovisceral response profiles. Some (e.g., Levenson,
2003) admit the possibility that certain basic emotions (e.g., joy) are
characterized by only low or even no physiological specificity at all,
because they entail no need for immediate survival-relevant responses.
Basically, emotion-specific bodily response patterns are thought to
physiologically prepare the organism for specific emotion-related ac-
tions, prioritizing response mobilization. Fear, for instance, initiates
preparation of a flight response, whereas anger prepares the body to
fight. To date, however, there is limited evidence for emotion-specifi-
city in physiological responses, although there remains much interest in
this question and its implications (e.g., Ax, 1953; Funkenstein, 1955;
Kreibig, 2010; Stemmler, 1992). Whereas – taken separately – several
studies seem to yield convincing evidence for the existence of emotion
specificity, an overall comparison of the results stemming from dif-
ferent experiments shows that these are, on the whole, inconsistent
(Cacioppo et al., 1997). To overcome this lack of consistency,
Stemmler's (1992) component process model of somatovisceral orga-
nization posits simultaneous influences of emotion-relevant and con-
textual effects on human physiology. This shifts the idea of absolute
emotion specificity from basic emotions (Ax, 1953; Ekman, 1992a;
Lange, 1922) to context-deviation specificity. A careful control or ex-
amination of contextual influences would thus be an indispensable re-
quirement for the identification of emotion-specific physiological
changes.
A related problem for proposed emotion specificity in physiological
responses is that even when confronted with the same overall experi-
mental situation, different individuals might engage in divergent cog-
nitive evaluations depending on prior experience and respective goals.
Different evaluations of the same situation would – according to ap-
praisal theorists (e.g., Lazarus, 1966) – lead to distinct physiological
responses and feeling states. Thus, instead of manipulating a situation
with respect to particular overall target emotions, various researchers
engaged in a systematic manipulation of specific appraisal outcomes
and studied their effects on physiology (e.g., Aue et al., 2007; Lazarus
and Alfert, 1964; Pecchinenda and Smith, 1996; Tomaka et al., 1997).
Contemporary models increasingly consider emotion-associated
central nervous response patterns (see also Section 4). Historically, the
limbic system was conceived as an essential component of the emo-
tional brain (e.g., Maclean, 1952; Papez, 1937). More recently, a largely
subcortical neural network with the amygdala as a key region has been
suggested to play a central role in the elicitation of fear (LeDoux, 2000;
Ohman and Mineka, 2001; see also Adolphs et al., 1995; LeDoux and
Brown, 2017). The amygdala projects to sensory cortices and both
cortical and subcortical regions, including the hippocampus, to influ-
ence perception, attention, and memory (Armony and Dolan, 2002). In
addition, via its connectivity with the thalamus and brain stem, the
amygdala can initiate defensive responses, even before the cortical
processing of detailed sensory information about threat (LeDoux,
2002). Because phobias persist despite the explicit knowledge that a
feared object is harmless, the fear module has been proposed to be
“impenetrable to conscious cognitive control” (Ohman and Mineka,
2001, p. 515).
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is suggested to support
emotional experience through body–brain interactions. According to
the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1996), human decisions are
guided by anticipation of the affective consequences of specific actions,
based on prior experience. This link between actions and anticipated
feeling consequences relies on the vmPFC and is encoded as somato-
visceral feelings through evoked physiological responses (the ‘body
loop’), and their simulated representation within the brain in somato-
sensory and, especially, interoceptive (insular) cortices (the “as if
loop”). Once established, somatic markers may be evoked predictively
to weigh outcomes of different actions, thereby biasing their choices
toward the best alternative (i.e., the one with the most desirable
affective consequence). In this context, somatic markers, especially the
“as if loop” are conceptually similar to interoceptive predictions
(priors) envisaged by Bayesian theorists (Barrett and Simmons, 2015;
Seth and Friston, 2016).
Recent Bayesian theories of emotion, including the Embodied
Predictive Interoception Coding (EPIC) model (Barrett and Simmons,
2015; see also Seth, 2013; Seth and Friston, 2016) emphasize the role of
cortex, notably the insula, in emotion generation. Transitional cortical
architecture is invoked to support Bayesian representations and com-
putations: pyramidal projection neurons in deep (V and VI) layers of
agranular cortex (in peri-genual anterior cingulate cortex, vmPFC,
anterior insula) generate predictions about physiological states (and
simulations of their interoceptive corollaries). These predictions are
sent, via cortico-cortical projections, to dysgranular posterior and mid-
insular (primary interoceptive) cortex. Here, visceromotor simulations
are compared to afferent interoceptive inputs from the thalamus within
a rudimentary layer IV (absent in agranular cortices) which, in turn,
generate prediction errors that are sent back to agranular cortices to
refine interoceptive predictions (Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Iteration
of this process allows interoceptive feelings to reflect changing phy-
siological conditions yet, if prediction error is small, what is experi-
enced as interoception may in fact reflect the visceromotor cortex's si-
mulation of rather than afferent representation of the body's
physiological state (Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
Cerebral asymmetry underpins theoretical proposals, including the
hypothesized right lateralization of emotional processes (Schwartz
et al., 1975), the valence hypothesis [left lateralization of positive
emotions, right lateralization of negative emotions (Gur et al., 1994)],
and the action tendency hypothesis [left lateralization of emotions as-
sociated with approach, right lateralization of emotions associated with
withdrawal – in particular within prefrontal areas (Harmon-Jones and
Allen, 1998)]. Meta-analysis of this topic (Wager et al., 2003), however,
does not fully support any of these emotion-lateralization theories. Left-
dominant activation of basal ganglia (including amygdala) during
withdrawal-related negative emotions, for instance, contrasts with all
theories mentioned above. What is more, the absence of reliable gender
differences in cerebral lateralization of emotions needs additional
consideration.
In summary, emotions are integrative phenomena that cannot be
unequivocally captured by any of the above formulations, though most
highlight interoceptive physiological contributions. Alternatives to the
somatovisceral origin of emotional experience in the James–Lange
theory typically propose central mechanisms for secondarily generating
interoceptive experience. For example: (1) interoception-like experi-
ences emanate from representations of the body in viscerosensory and
somatosensory cortices via an “as-if” pathway (Damasio, 1996); (2)
output of central generators of emotion (e.g., amygdala) may evoke
peripheral events that are then perceived via interoception (LeDoux,
2000); or (3) cortically generated predictions of peripheral states gen-
erate subjective interoceptive experience after being compared with
current afferent information from the periphery (Barrett and Simmons,
2015). The following section will consider how and why human emo-
tion, including its interoceptive components, may have evolved.
3. Evolutionary considerations
According to Darwin's theory of evolution, variations in traits not
aiding in perpetuation of a species will be selected against, and ulti-
mately eliminated from the gene pool, whereas characteristics proving
beneficial are likely to be passed down to subsequent generations
(Darwin, 1859). Though most often considered in terms of physical
traits and behaviors, Darwin's theory of evolution also applies to
emotions (Darwin, 1872). Emotions serve an evolutionary purpose:
their experience and expression enable adaptive reactions to survival-
and reproduction-related threats and opportunities (Ekman, 1992b;
Nesse, 1990; Ohman, 1986; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Darwin (1872)
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proposed the “principle of serviceable associated habits” asserting
human emotional expression originates as an evolutionarily beneficial
mode of intra-species communication of intentions.
To function effectively as a means of communication, emotions
must be innate and culturally universal (Darwin, 1872). Notably, the
way infants express emotions is consistent with adults (Izard et al.,
1980). Likewise, mannerisms used by congenitally blind individuals to
express emotions like happiness and pride do not differ from those in
sighted individuals, despite never visually witnessing these behaviors
(Galati et al., 1997; Matsumoto and Willingham, 2009). Across cultures,
people experience and understand emotions similarly, even those
without connection to the modern world (Ekman, 1984, 1993; Ekman
et al., 1969; Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein and Ambady,
2003; Izard, 1971, 1994). Arguably these illustrations exist because
emotional expression is not learned, but is rather genetically encoded
by evolutionary processes.
In addition, because of a shared evolutionary history, primates’
emotional expressions mirror those exhibited by humans. Specifically,
facial structures of humans and chimpanzees have functional simila-
rities suggesting the capability to create similar facial expressions
(Waller et al., 2006). Indeed, during positive interactions, non-human
primates exhibit a “silent bared-teeth display” (reminiscent of a human
smile) and “relaxed open-mouth display” (mimicking a human laugh)
(Preuschoft, 1992). Likewise, humans share expressions of embarrass-
ment with other mammals: face touching paired with downward head
movements and eye gaze (Keltner, 1995; Keltner and Anderson, 2000;
Keltner and Buswell, 1997). The universality of emotional behavior and
expression supports the argument that emotion developed evolutiona-
rily.
Evolutionary behaviors are those necessary for survival of a species.
Eating and mating are essential behaviors that allow a species to sur-
vive. Increased dopamine (DA) release in mesolimbic reward circuitry
is associated with approach behaviors that promote survival. For ex-
ample, the presence of food triggers an increase in extracellular DA in
the nucleus accumbens (Hernandez and Hoebel, 1988; Yoshida et al.,
1992) and this increase in DA provides a chemical reward, encouraging
future eating behavior. Similarly, increased DA is associated with
sexual activity (Damsma et al., 1992; Pfaus et al., 1995) and, again, the
pleasurable experience of increased DA triggers reward motivation,
increasing potential for the behaviors to occur again.
Importantly, however, as an animal learns which stimuli predict the
availability of reward, DA release advances in time to occur when such
predictive signs appear rather than at reward delivery – an adaptation
that facilitates reinforcement-based learning and promotes reward
motivation and appetitive behaviors (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Glimcher,
2011). Reward motivation is particularly relevant to emotion. Specifi-
cally, positive high-approach motivating emotions like desire are as-
sociated with increased DA in the mesolimbic dopaminergic reward
circuit, thereby promoting desire or wanting, and activating advance-
ment toward a particular goal (Robinson et al., 2005). Research also
suggests DA is actively involved in aversive motivation like escape
behavior (Faure et al., 2008; Salamone, 1992). DA in the nucleus ac-
cumbens thus modulates the neocortical and subcortical areas involved
in affective processes, influencing both approach and avoidance motor
activity (Salamone, 1992). This “wanting” (incentive salience) system,
which relies on the mesolimbic DA circuit, is distinct from neural sys-
tems that generate pleasure (“liking”) which relies on more diffuse
neural loci activated by a variety of neurotransmitters (e.g., neuro-
peptides) but not DA (Berridge and Robinson, 2016).
Approach and withdrawal motivating emotions are associated with
evolutionarily important outcomes (Darwin, 1872; Plutchik, 1980).
Fear triggers sympathetic arousal, which promotes muscle activation
and subsequent escape from predators (Frijda, 1986, 2009; Frijda et al.,
1989). Desire triggers approach motivation toward a desired object.
Anger results in renewed efforts to keep desired objects, be they food,
sexual partners, or otherwise (Plutchik, 1980). Increases in DA motivate
approach (wanting) behavior toward eating, mating, protection of self
and kin and other behaviors necessary for perpetuation of the species.
The pleasure (liking) associated these beneficial behaviors positively
reinforces them, ensuring their reoccurrence; resulting in both wanting
and liking systems being transmitted to offspring and descendants.
Emotions associated with evolutionarily important outcomes are
high in motivation to approach or withdraw. Emotions high in moti-
vation, to approach – e.g., desire and anger – or withdraw – e.g., fear –
both result in narrowed cognitive breadth (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013).
Narrowed breadth associated with these emotions may make goals to
approach or avoid more attainable. That is, by focusing attention on the
target (e.g., a desired object or escape route), the individual is less
likely to be distracted by irrelevant stimuli that may prevent successful
goal completion (Harmon-Jones et al., 2017). If emotion and the as-
sociated cognitive narrowing are in fact evolutionarily developed pro-
cesses, they should be well integrated. When a cognitive and an emo-
tional process are integrated, they develop the capacity to influence
each other bidirectionally (Simon, 1967). Indeed, the relationship be-
tween high approach motivating desire and attention is bidirectional,
such that simply narrowing one's attentional scope increases approach
motivation for desirable desserts (Kotynski and Demaree, 2017).
The adaptive significance for survival and reproduction is clear for
interoceptive sensations associated with desire for and fulfillment of
basic drives. Afferent information from interoception undoubtedly
supports these basic drives such as osmoreception for thirst or meta-
boreception for hunger. Similarly, interoceptive signals indicating
physiological deviation (prediction error) from homeostatic limits have
obvious adaptive significance (e.g., thermoregulation) (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015; Seth and Friston, 2016). However, the adaptive sig-
nificance, in humans, of being able to sense and form predictive models
of other varieties of interoceptive signals, for example of muscle tone
being increased by anger or decreased during fear (freezing), may lie in
the evolution of complex social behavior. As suggested by the somatic
marker hypothesis (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Damasio, 1996), in-
teroceptive information may bias behavior in the direction of the most
advantageous outcome; in evolutionary terms being the behavior most
likely to transmit ones genetic information to subsequent generations
and survive long enough to do so. Here, subtler internal signals, both
predictive and afferent from the PNS, may help individuals negotiate
complex social behaviors (Otten et al., 2017), for example, those within
a social dominance hierarchy.
In conclusion, though Darwin's theory of evolution is frequently
considered in the context of physical traits or behaviors, it also explains
humans’ adapted capacity for emotion (Darwin, 1872). The experience
and expression of emotions are universal: similar in other mammals as
well as humans of all ages across cultures. Emotion may have evolved to
make evolutionarily beneficial actions like eating, mating, and pro-
tecting oneself more motivating, rewarding, and likely to occur. Emo-
tions are therefore traits naturally selected for as they provide greater
chances of perpetuation of the human species. The next section will
begin consideration of CNS representations of emotional perception and
expression.
4. Central representation of emotions
4.1. Neuroimaging
Representations of emotions in the CNS have been investigated
using a variety of frameworks (Murphy et al., 2003). Single-system
models of emotion – such as the limbic system (Maclean, 1952) and the
right-hemisphere models (Adolphs et al., 1996; Borod et al., 1998,
2001; Heller and Nitschke, 1997) posit that one neurological system
drives the experience and expression of all emotions. Dual-system
models examine potential dissociable dichotomies such as valence or
approach and withdrawal (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009; Davidson,
1984, 1998; Davidson et al., 1990; Feldman Barrett and Russell, 1999;
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Lang et al., 1997; Posner et al., 2005; Russell, 2003; Schmidt and
Schulkin, 2000). Multi-system models conceptualize emotions and their
correlates as discrete (Lindquist et al., 2012). Recent advancements in
functional neuroimaging have afforded the opportunity to examine the
neurophysiological basis of emotions in vivo, allowing for greater de-
lineation of the central mechanisms supporting affective processes.
Single-system models have largely been absorbed into more com-
plex theories. For example, the limbic system hypothesis, proposed by
(Maclean, 1952), holds that subcortical structures constitute one system
that is responsible for the experience and expression of all emotion. In a
review, Murphy et al. (2003) found almost no substantial support for
this view. However, involvement of the classical components of the
limbic-system in emotional processing and experiences is undeniable.
Similarly, the right hemisphere hypothesis, which views the right
hemisphere as more emotional in general (Adolphs et al., 1996; Borod
et al., 1998, 2001; Heller and Nitschke, 1997), has received mixed
support (Murphy et al., 2003). Other versions of the hypothesis are
better supported, but are still inconclusive. Valence asymmetry (the
right hemisphere is responsible for negative emotions and the left for
positive) has also received only limited support (Lindquist et al., 2012,
2016; Murphy et al., 2003). Similarly, many failed to find support for a
hemispheric dichotomy between emotion perception versus expression
(Adolphs et al., 1996; Borod et al., 1998, 2001; Heller and Nitschke,
1997). Recent studies suggest that emotion may be functionally later-
alized in specific structures, rather than the entire cerebrum (Beraha
et al., 2012; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012, 2016; Murphy
et al., 2003).
Instead, some researchers advocate an approach-avoidance asym-
metry model (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009; Carver et al., 2000;
Davidson, 1998; Davidson et al., 1990; Lang et al., 1997; Schmidt and
Schulkin, 2000). Murphy et al. (2003) found left-lateralization for ap-
proach emotions and bilateral symmetry for withdrawal emotions, but
only in the cases of happiness and sadness and in anterior brain regions.
However, individual differences exist as to whether anger is an ap-
proach or avoidance emotion (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009;
Harmon-Jones, 2003). Thus, the approach-avoidance distinction holds
for emotions such as happiness, compassion, and fear, but its limited
support may be due to individual differences or varying induction
procedures.
Multi-system models of emotion usually encompass basic emotions,
which can be discrete or continuous. Basic emotions are cross-cultural,
intuitively understood, and named across languages (Ekman, 1999).
Common lists include anger, anxiety, disgust, fear, happiness, and
sadness. This model has also received both support (Celeghin et al.,
2017; Vytal and Hamann, 2010) and criticism, with strong, consistent
evidence for specialized fear processing in the amygdala and disgust
processing in the insula and globus pallidus (Murphy et al., 2003), but
other emotions show mixed neural representation (for review, please
see Lindquist et al., 2012). Moreover, basic emotions still vary along
dimensions of valence and arousal (Posner et al., 2005). Reviews have
consistently concluded that single-system models are too simple, dual-
system models are too coarse, and that there may not be completely
distinct neural profiles for each basic emotion (Lindquist et al., 2012,
2016, 2012; Murphy et al., 2003; Touroutoglou et al., 2015). Rather,
emotions likely arise from interacting neural components, and may be
differentiated by subcortical and cortical networks based on their
evolutionary functions (Barrett and Satpute, 2013; Berntson et al.,
2007; Citron et al., 2014; Lindquist et al., 2012, 2016; Pessoa and
Adolphs, 2010).
Perhaps one of the most formidable advancements in affective
neuroscience has been the leveraging of big data resources to test
theories of emotion and to develop convergent evidence regarding
underlying neural representations. For example, application of activa-
tion likelihood estimation (ALE), a robust meta-analytic technique that
statistically tests for convergence of activation patterns in functional
neuroimaging data, reveals consistent, dissociable activation of distinct
areas for happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust (Vytal and
Hamann, 2010). Emotion specificity was confirmed by comparing
emotion categories against each other. Kirby and Robinson (2017) re-
plicated Vytal and Hamann's (2010) work using the BrainMap database
and ten times the number of studies. Although evidence of distinct
networks was found for some emotions, there were also brain regions
that were consistently activated across all emotions, suggesting a multi-
system model (Kirby and Robinson, 2017). Their results indicated more
distributed subcortical- and prefrontal-based networks also observed
elsewhere (Lindquist et al., 2012, 2016). Their findings were strongly
right-lateralized and had strong contributions from classical limbic
structures. They also found all emotions associated with activity in the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, suggesting it might serve as an
emotional processing hub (Eickhoff et al., 2016; Kirby and Robinson,
2017; Robinson et al., 2010). Together, these meta-analyses seem to
support, in part, elements of the right hemisphere hypothesis and
provide limited support for a multi-system approach.
Other meta-analytic approaches have spurred new insights into af-
fective processing. For example, Lindquist et al. (2012) framed their
investigation in terms of locationism versus constructionism. Loca-
tionism ascribes specialized functions to discrete neural areas, whereas
a constructionist view sees emotion as an emergent property of existing
cognitive processes. They tested the locationist view in several regions
mentioned in previous reviews, finding a lack of consistency and spe-
cificity across studies. They concluded that locationism is overly re-
ductionist, and instead favored constructionism. Kober et al. (2008)
eschewed theory and opted for a data-driven approach instead. They
found six functional groups related to emotion, which they declined to
label. Depending on meta-analytic method, idiosyncrasies of individual
studies, particularly those with high numbers of participants, could
potentially bias the meta-analyses and fail to reveal the true nature of
the common activation across neuroimaging studies on a particular
topic. Furthermore, the utility of Kober et al.’s (2008) data-driven ap-
proach without reference to socially-accepted categories is unclear,
especially in the context of clinical and other applied work regarding
emotions.
It is important to note that meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies
have strong limitations. First, most of the analyses rely to some degree
on database infrastructure, which may represent only a fraction of
neuroimaging papers (Derrfuss and Mar, 2009), may be biased toward
specific psychological processes (i.e., cognition), or may not have suf-
ficiently specific information to adequately test affective processes (e.g.,
unclear operational definitions; the Human Affectome Project seeks to
address this issue). This becomes particularly important in the discus-
sion of emotion because different modalities can elicit varying degrees
of emotion, and to our knowledge, there is no database that accounts
for the dimensionality of emotional experience (i.e., valence and
arousal). Second, the variety of presentations (e.g., visual versus audi-
tory) may have substantial effects on the neural processing streams,
especially as they relate to emotion (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). Thus,
the very strengths of meta-analytic methods (i.e., ignoring study spe-
cific features to identify convergent patterns of activations) can also be
their weaknesses when applied to emotions. Toward overcoming these
limitations, Müller et al. (2018) have recently developed a list of ten
rules to improve the integrity and generalizability of neuroimaging
meta-analyses.
Reviews and meta-analyses have treated interoception separately
from studies emotion (e.g., Critchley and Harrison, 2013; Schulz, 2016)
although findings of recent investigations have converged (Adolfi et al.,
2017; Craig, 2010; Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017; Singer et al., 2009).
One recent meta-analysis showed convergence of areas linked to in-
teroception, emotion regulation, and social cognition in the right
anterior insula and neighboring lateral frontal areas, as well as the
amygdala and basal ganglia (Adolfi et al., 2017; see also Singer et al.,
2009). There is some evidence showing that the insula shows a postero-
anterior gradient in successive stages of interoceptive processing (Craig,
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2009; Namkung et al., 2017). Notably the agranular cortices (e.g., peri-
genual anterior cingulate cortex, vmPFC, anterior insula) are hy-
pothesized to generate predictions of interoceptive feelings that can, in
turn, predict the physiological consequences of emotional states
(Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Seth and Friston, 2016).
Big data approaches have provided, to date, the most comprehen-
sive survey of CNS emotion representation. However, they rely heavily
on the models of emotion used by researchers which may bias coding
and testing of results in later meta-analyses. Additionally, procedural
differences across studies abound. For example, emotion elicitation
practices vary widely. They may activate any number of neural net-
works and cognitive processes. Until we have a large, comprehensive
database with strong operational definitions, it will be difficult to
conclusively understand the CNS representation of various emotions.
Further compounding the issue, small brain structures such as the
amygdala, can be particularly difficult to image. Choices in pre-pro-
cessing steps such as spatial smoothing (Fransson et al., 2002) and
motion correction (Johnstone et al., 2006) may change observed acti-
vation patterns. Inconsistency across studies could also be due to the
use of different selection criteria and meta-analytic techniques, as re-
viewed in Kirby and Robinson (2017). In order to increase our under-
standing of the central representation of emotion, we need large-scale
functional neuroimaging studies that encompass a variety of affective
tasks.
Whereas fMRI studies provide cutting-edge spatial resolution for
investigating emotion representation, they provide poor temporal re-
solution. Because emotions are a dynamic, unfolding process in re-
sponse to triggering events, converging operations are needed to ex-
amine them more completely. Electrophysiological markers of emotion
do just that: ERPs derived from encephalography (EEG) reflect neuro-
physiological responses immediately following triggering by an emo-
tional stimulus. While MEG also has a similar temporal resolution to
EEG and better spatial localization, it is limited in only being able to
measure brain activity from sulci (and not cortical gyri), and little re-
search focusing on MEG indices of emotion has been implemented to
date. Therefore, we focus on ERP indices of emotion here.
4.2. Electrophysiological and peripheral measures of emotion
Before techniques of functional neuroimaging became widely
available in the 1990s, classical psychophysiology of emotion had al-
ready created an immense body of knowledge on electrophysiological
and peripheral measures of emotional experience as well as overt and
covert emotional expression. Such measures, including time- and fre-
quency-domain EEG, cardiovascular indices, electrodermal responses
and facial electromyography including the startle response, are de-
scribed in detail in four successive volumes since 1990 of Cacioppo,
Tassinary and Berntson's Handbook of Psychophysiology (Cacioppo et al.,
2017). Especially informative have been indices that directly reflect
responses of the autonomic nervous system such as skin conductance
(Critchley, 2002; Dawson et al., 2007) and high frequency heart rate
variability, also termed respiratory sinus arrhythmia or RSA (Balzarotti
et al., 2017; Electrophysiology, 1996), as indices of sympathetic and
parasympathetic activity respectively. This is consistent with the notion
that RSA reflects self-regulatory ability (e.g., Thayer and Lane, 2000).
While historically sympathetic and parasympathetic indices have typi-
cally been examined independently, the importance of examining the
dynamic interplay between sympathetic and parasympathetic regula-
tion (such as balance or co-activation/co-inhibition) has been high-
lighted more recently as important for a comprehensive understanding
of autonomic regulation, as these indices are not necessarily re-
ciprocally controlled (Berntson et al., 1991; Sunagawa et al., 1998). Of
similar importance are HPA axis (cortisol) and other biochemical stress
biomarkers (e.g., Strahler et al., 2017). Peripheral and electro-
physiological measures are of continued importance in understanding
emotional behavior and have been exceedingly successful in
combination with neuroimaging paradigms (e.g., Critchley and
Harrison, 2013; Milad and Quirk, 2012). Some more recently adopted
techniques for studying emotion in healthy subjects include measures of
inflammation (see Section 9), genetic markers (e.g., Jonassen and
Landro, 2014), diverse forms of experimental neurostimulation (e.g.,
Busch et al., 2013; Kuo and Nitsche, 2015) and complex emotion re-
cognition algorithms (Mehta et al., 2018). Details of these diverse
methodologies are beyond the scope of this review but well described in
the above-cited and similar sources. Here we will focus on findings from
EEG time-domain measures – the method most often used to examine
brain responses to emotional stimuli with high temporal resolution.
Frequency domain EEG measures of emotion are briefly considered but
not the emerging field of EEG source localization that is also increas-
ingly used in studies of emotion (see Pourtois et al., 2008).
4.2.1. Electrophysiological indices of emotion
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are time-domain scalp-recorded
brain potentials that can provide temporally precise information re-
garding the processing of affective stimuli through the examination of
the amplitudes and latencies of ERP components (Rugg and Coles,
1995). ERPs reflect neural changes in the milliseconds range that reflect
rapid processing of affective stimuli, including perception, attending
and orienting responses, which are critical aspects of emotional re-
sponding (Olofsson et al., 2008). Their high temporal precision allows
for a detailed examination of the time course of an emotional response,
providing greater ability to disentangle key processes. Several ERP
components have been identified that are particularly relevant to the
processing of motivationally salient information. ERP components of
emotion processing are typically elicited in experimental paradigms
involving viewing of emotional pictures or faces, sometimes including
emotion regulation instructions, or in tasks involving anticipation of
reward or reward related feedback. While these components do not
map onto discrete emotions, they reflect mechanisms underlying pro-
cessing of emotional information, such as motivational value.
The late positive potential (LPP) and early posterior negativity
(EPN) are two components that have been examined in the context of
neural processing of visual emotional stimuli. The EPN has been iden-
tified as the first cortical ERP component reflecting the facilitated
processing of emotional stimuli at the early perceptual level (Schupp
et al., 2004). The EPN develops at around 150ms and is maximal be-
tween 250 and 300ms after picture onset. The amplitude of the EPN is
most pronounced for affective stimuli of high evolutionary significance,
such as erotic images or pictures of mutilations (Schupp et al., 2004).
Source analysis of the EPN amplitude identified a widespread network
of temporo-parieto-occipital areas implicated in visual information
processing (Junghofer et al., 2001). Furthermore, a recent fMRI study
using rapid visual picture presentation (Junghofer et al., 2002) revealed
increased activations by emotional pictures in occipital (occipital, lin-
gual and fusiform gyrus, cuneus, calcarine), temporal (superior, mid-
and inferior-temporal gyrus), and parietal (inferior and superior par-
ietal, angular, supramarginal gyrus, precuneus) structures. The LPP is a
positive deflection of the ERP signal most apparent around 400–600ms
following an emotional stimulus that is thought to reflect motivated
attention to things of emotional significance to the individual (Brown
et al., 2012; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2010). The LPP is
considered to be a useful neurophysiological measure for studying
emotion and emotion regulation across the life span (Hajcak et al.,
2010), and it has been repeatedly shown to be enhanced (increased in
magnitude) in response to emotional (relative to neutral) stimuli
(Hajcak et al., 2010). The LPP is generated in occipital and parietal
cortices (Sabatinelli et al., 2007), which both receive projections from
the amygdala, a region critical for emotional processing. Importantly,
the LPP is influenced by directed instructions to utilize specific emotion
regulation strategies, such that its amplitude is reduced following
emotion regulation strategies aimed at reducing an emotional response
(Foti et al., 2015; Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis, 2006).
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Several ERP indices associated with reward anticipation and receipt
have also been identified. The feedback negativity (FN) is a negative
deflection of the ERP signal that peaks around 250ms following the
receipt of feedback or reward. The FN is considered to be an index of
the function of a performance monitoring/evaluative system that ra-
pidly assesses the motivational salience of positive and negative en-
vironmental feedback (Bress et al., 2013; Bress et al., 2012). The FN is
thought to relate to flexible selection of actions aimed at pursuing re-
wards and is part of a reinforcement learning system used to adjust
subsequent behavior (Bress et al., 2012). The FN is correlated with
measures of reward sensitivity and is thought to reflect a binary eva-
luation of feedback as unfavorable or favorable (loss vs. gains) (Hajcak
et al., 2007; Holroyd et al., 2003). Neuroimaging and source localiza-
tion studies have shown that the FN is generated primarily by the
anterior cingulate cortex, an important hub for integrating cognitive
and affective processing that is also involved in emotion regulation and
flexible responding (Foti et al., 2015). Concurrent ERP and fMRI studies
have demonstrated that the FN amplitude is also associated with ac-
tivity in the ventral striatum (Foti et al., 2011), another key area for
reward processing (Liu et al., 2011).
The cue-P3 and the contingent negative variation (CNV) have been
associated with aspects of reward anticipation (Goldstein et al., 2006;
Pfabigan et al., 2014), where the cue-P3 reflects aspects of salience and
attention during the reward anticipation process, and the CNV reflects
more aspects of cognitive effort involved in the anticipation process. In
the context of a reward task, the cue-P3 is a centroparietal positivity
which emerges between 300 and 600ms after an anticipation cue and
its amplitude increases as a function of reinforcer magnitude (Broyd
et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006). The cue-P3 has been associated
with neural activity in reward related regions, including the ventral
striatum (Pfabigan et al., 2014), and is thought to reflect variation in
context updating in working memory, such as updating whether a po-
tential gain or loss is at stake in a monetary guessing task (Bonala and
Jansen, 2012). The CNV is a negative-going potential shift that is pri-
marily associated with anticipatory attention and preparation of ef-
fortful processes (Falkenstein et al., 2003; Gomez et al., 2007) and has
been assumed to reflect neural activity within the thalamo–cortico–s-
triatal network (Fan et al., 2007; Macar and Vidal, 2003).
Frequency based measures of EEG activity have not been used as
extensively to study emotional responses, but there has been increasing
interest in the utility of these measures, particularly in the area of
emotional responses to rewarding stimuli (see Glazer et al., 2018 for
review). For example, measures of alpha, beta, delta, or gamma neural
oscillations in response to rewarding stimuli may provide com-
plementary information to what ERP components such as the FN may
provide. These oscillatory changes in the EEG signal in response to
affective stimuli are also referred to as event related spectral pertur-
bations (Makeig et al., 2004). Alpha de-synchronization in response to
affective pictures has also been related to the LPP and is thought to
provide complementary information about sustained attention to
emotionally salient stimuli (for review, see Uusberg et al., 2013).
In studies of interoception, it is possible to measure experimentally-
induced ERPs to stimuli targeting distinct organ systems (e.g., re-
spiratory evoked potentials). However, ERP studies of interoceptive
sensations have focused on the ‘natural’ heartbeat evoked potential
(HEP), a positive potential occurring maximally in frontocentral deri-
vations 250–350ms following the R-wave in the ECG (Pollatos and
Schandry, 2004). The HEP probably reflects afferent signals originating
in vascular sensors (e.g., baroreceptors) transmitted rostrally via the
vagus and glossopharyngeal nerves and processed in the insular and
anterior cingulate cortices. The amplitude of the HEP is significantly
greater in those who can more accurately detect their own heartbeat
(Pollatos and Schandry, 2004). To the extent that changes in emotion
reflect increased arousal, the HEP may index emotional state (Luft and
Bhattacharya, 2015) Additionally, as is the case for accuracy of inter-
oceptive heartbeat detection (Herbert et al., 2007; Pollatos et al., 2007),
the HEP may be related to state and trait measures of emotion
(Fukushima et al., 2011). Interoceptive information, arrives at the
cortex via spinal Lamina 1 fibers (Craig, 2016) or afferent components
of the vagus nerve (Berthoud and Neuhuber, 2000) both of which are
weakly myelinated and hence conduct relatively slowly. Could such
interoceptive afferents influence ERPs that can occur within 150ms of a
perceived exteroceptive stimulus? Although HEPs occur within
250–350ms of the R-wave (Pollatos and Schandry, 2004), it is possible
that interoceptive effects on more rapid response potentials, such as the
auditory N1 (at 140–170ms), may result from predictions of physio-
logical states that originate within the CNS itself (Babo-Rebelo et al.,
2016; van Elk et al., 2014).
The following section will address interoception in greater detail
along with discussion of three emotion-related subjective experiences,
the first two of which, pain and disgust, are defined by their inter-
oceptive features and the third of which, empathy, may be a human
capacity uniquely dependent on interoception. First, however, the im-
portant linkages between the autonomic nervous system, interoception
and emotion must be considered.
5. Autonomic nervous system and emotion
In the last century, influential theories have emphasized the role of
the autonomic nervous system (ANS) in emotion. Bodily manifestations
are often central to the experience of emotion, such as feeling a strong
heartbeat when fearful. The bodily aspects of emotion are largely
mediated by the ANS, a collection of nerve cells/fibers projecting from
the spinal cord to the viscera (e.g., organs, glands, blood vessels, air-
ways). The correlation between emotion and autonomic activity is be-
lieved to have an evolutionary function (Darwin, 1872). By distributing
metabolic and other physiological resources, autonomic changes in
visceral activity support emotional behaviors with survival value (e.g.,
approach reward, avoid threat; Levenson, 2003; Tomkins, 1962). ANS
activity also influences sensory-perceptual processes that drive the ex-
perience of emotion (Craig, 2003a; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013;
James, 1884). The diverse actions of the ANS are achieved by its
complex organization wherein each ANS branch has afferent fibers that
carry visceral information to the brain (bottom-up) and efferent fibers
that regulate the viscera based on brain activity (top-down). This con-
struction allows for feedback loops that are critical to homeostasis,
stress, and emotional experience (Benarroch, 1993; Chwalisz et al.,
1988). Despite its complexity and debated place in emotion theories
(Friedman and Thayer, 2018), the role of the ANS in emotion can be
summarized with two themes: specificity and causation.
5.1. Specificity
If the ANS supports behaviors unique to a specific emotion, then
emotions should differ in their characteristic patterning of ANS activity.
This notion of autonomic specificity has been widely debated in the
dominant theories of emotion. Adding further complexity to the matter,
views on the autonomic specificity of emotions also raise the related
issue of the causal relationship between emotional experience and ANS
function.
William James (James, 1884) and Carl Lange (Lange, 1885/
1912Lange, /, 1912Lange, 1885/1912) were the first to formulate that
emotions have differentiable ANS patterns. This model, that came to be
known as the “James–Lange” theory of emotion, has scaffolded decades
of research on basic emotions. Here, motivationally relevant stimuli
first elicit autonomic and bodily changes, which then lead to emotional
experience. For physiology to elicit specific feelings, emotions should
have unique patterns of ANS responses. Biologically-oriented theories
of emotion embrace autonomic specificity because reliable activation of
pre-programmed physiological patterns is efficient and conducive to
survival (Ekman, 1992b; Levenson, 2003; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
The notion that basic emotions have some degree of autonomic
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specificity is supported by rich experimental work (for review, see
Kreibig, 2010) and multi-measure studies using statistical classification
(Christie and Friedman, 2004; Kragel and Labar, 2013; Stephens et al.,
2010).
A case has also been made for a lack of autonomic specificity
(Barrett, 2006). This concept is not new, however. Cannon (1927) di-
rectly challenged James by stating that emotional feelings and ANS
responses are independent, and that autonomic responses are diffuse,
rather than patterned. Later, influential cognitive theories of emotion
de-emphasized the centrality of autonomic function in favor of top-
down appraisals (Ellsworth, 2013; Quigley and Barrett, 2014). For ex-
ample, the two-factor theory emphasizes global autonomic “arousal”
that leads to experience through the filter of socially constructed ap-
praisals (Schachter and Singer, 1962).
Cognitive theories and their evidence do not hold a monolithic view
of ANS specificity. Across the last four decades, studies have shown that
appraisals of stressors can lead to differentiable patterns of ANS activity
(Scherer, 1984). Of note, appraisal-generated patterns of ANS activity
appear broader than those of the discrete emotions suggested by James
(1884) and others (e.g., Ekman, 1992b). These diverse findings inspire
the question: does ANS activity map onto discrete categories or onto
broader dimensions related to appraisals and motivational significance?
Studies in the past few decades support a role for both, implying a
gradient of autonomic specificity where autonomic differentiation ex-
ists at multiple levels (e.g., Christie and Friedman, 2004; Nyklíček et al.,
1997; Witvliet and Vrana, 1995). Obfuscating the matter, the degree of
ANS specificity appears subject to contextual factors, individual dif-
ferences, and the method of emotion elicitation (Cacioppo et al., 2000;
Stemmler, 2003). Taken together, the ANS specificity of emotion con-
ceivably exists on a continuum with the degree of specificity being
determined by a constellation of neuropsychological and environmental
variables that change over time. Such complexity in the coordination
between ANS physiology and emotional state is possible and quantifi-
able in a dynamical systems model of emotion (Lewis, 2005; Thayer and
Friedman, 1997). Here, the ANS rapidly “explores” many affective
states in the state-space, and strong attractors (i.e., basic emotions) can
pull the organism into a more programmed ANS pattern if multiple
conditions are satisfied.
5.2. Causation
Does the ANS cause emotional experience in a bottom-up fashion, or
are autonomic responses generated by top-down factors, such as af-
fective experience and/or brain activity? Understanding the causal
connections between these components is critical for a precise defini-
tion of emotion. For James and his successors in discrete emotion
theory, specific physiological patterns cause emotional experience
through autonomic afference to the brain (Friedman, 2010). These af-
ferent pathways have empirical support, such that autonomic afference
from the viscera influences perceptual activity in the brain (Damasio
et al., 2000; Park et al., 2014). Afferent influences on emotional ex-
perience likely occur both inside and outside conscious awareness
(Vuilleumier, 2005).
Cognitive appraisal models of emotion adopt a view opposite of the
bottom-up perspective: cognitions about motivationally salient events
cause ANS responses in a top-down manner (Blascovich and Tomaka,
1996; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The evidence used to support the
top-down view is vast but mostly correlational. Experimental designs
are rarely employed to substantiate that cognition causes emotion-re-
lated ANS responses. The top-down view nevertheless remains strong in
cognitive neuroscience where the expression and regulation of emotion
is putatively grounded in the frontal lobe regulation of subcortical
emotion regions, including autonomic source nuclei (Roy et al., 2012;
Wager et al., 2009). As with autonomic specificity, an “either–or” ap-
proach to reconciling the bottom-up vs. top-down issue is too simplistic.
Functional models of central-autonomic relationships have emphasized
both autonomic afference and efference as well as their dynamic in-
terplay in emotion (Craig, 2002; Damasio, 1994; Thayer and Lane,
2000). Direct empirical evidence for afferent–efferent interaction is
surprisingly sparse, however. Neuroimaging findings revealing rela-
tions between brain activity and ANS responses during emotion are
often interpreted in terms of the brain causing autonomic responses –
although the direction of causation here is suggestive due to correla-
tional designs (Macefield et al., 2013; Roy et al., 2012; Thayer et al.,
2012).
Empirical support for the afferent determination of emotion may be
lacking because this question is one of cause-and-effect, ultimately re-
quiring the tight controls afforded by experimentation. While it is clear
that top-down factors and the ANS interact in emotion, the dynamics of
such interactions are relatively unknown. To this end, sophisticated
mathematical approaches can prove useful in unraveling the complex
nonlinear dynamics that characterize brain–body relationships (Lewis,
2005; Thayer and Lane, 2000). Leveraging modeling approaches with
experimental techniques (e.g., pharmacological blockade and lesions)
might clarify the causal role of ANS responses in emotion.
6. Interoception
6.1. Interoceptive systems
To recap, interoception describes the body-to-brain afferent sig-
naling, central processing, and neural and mental representation of
internal bodily changes. Interoception thus encompasses information
concerning the dynamic functions of visceral organs, humoral cells,
nutrients, hormonal messengers and signals of health and disease.
Recent advances in understanding of interoceptive mechanisms include
clearer anatomical description of peripheral and cerebral pathways
from different bodily organs) and distinct (neural and psychological)
levels of interoceptive representation and control.
Salient and emotive perceptions and cognitions elicit changes in
bodily physiology which, through interoception, are encoded into af-
fective feelings (Tsakiris and Critchley, 2016). The expression of emo-
tion encompasses both organ-specific and general system-level changes
in internal physiology, evoked most rapidly by efferent neural signals,
notably autonomic responses that characteristically occur in-
dependently of volitional control. Autonomic responses and the inter-
oceptive feedback typically guide mundane homeostatic reflexes, yet
when faced with emotional challenge this vegetative control is sus-
pended in support of response-related bodily states (for example, ac-
tion-readiness when faced with the motivational immediacy of mortal
threat). The accompanying motivational brain states and the inter-
oceptive feedback of these short-term ‘allostatic’ responses contribute
to the affective and emotional experience.
Physiological patterning of bodily change is suggested by the con-
sistency with which people refer to particular internal bodily sensations
when describing their emotional experiences (Nummenmaa et al.,
2014). Consensus within cultures reinforce such categorical association,
enabling a shared understanding of emotional categories. Nevertheless,
even within an individual, interoceptive feelings (e.g. brief brady-
cardia) can be ascribed to very distinct emotions (heart stopping with
fright or skipping with love). While interoceptive contributions to
emotion are widely appreciated, controversy remains as to the degree
to which interoceptive information can be emotion-specific, or even if
specific emotions exist (Barrett, 2017b).
Interoception by definition originates from within the body, and not
the environment: it is distinct from proprioception (information about
bodily position) and from touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing (sam-
pling the environment). Nevertheless, interoception is a broad term that
refers to distinct and specific types of information originating from
distinct sensor-types (e.g. stretch receptors in hollow organs, chemor-
eceptors in brain and nerve endings) conveyed through different af-
ferent channels (humoral, neural, spinal, cranial nerve). These afferent
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pathways interact with each other, and with exteroceptive information,
at multiple levels of the neuraxis where efferent autonomic and/or
hormonal/humoral responses may also be triggered hierarchically
(Critchley and Harrison, 2013). Broader definitions also exist (Craig,
2016), which view interoception as a general integrated perception of
bodily sensations (‘intero-perception’), and resemble earlier concepts
e.g. coenesthesia (Ceunen et al., 2016; Mehling, 2016). The physiolo-
gical/homeostatic nature of information is perhaps part of the defini-
tion and much of this ascends in the Lamina 1 spinothalamic tract
(Craig, 2016). This spinal tract also carries unmyelinated tickle, pain
and temperature fibers from the skin; an organization that is used to
support the notion that these motivationally-important bodily signals
are also interoceptive.
The central representation, and ultimately the perceptual char-
acteristics of interoceptive information, reflect the specific afferent
pathway and the strength of the afferent signal. Interoceptive sensa-
tions are typically more general and diffuse than somatomotor and
somatosensory (including most pain) sensations that are more precisely
localizable. Interoceptive information may also parallel, merge with, or
be overshadowed by exteroceptive sensations, e.g. the somatosensory
and proprioceptive feelings of air-flow and chest expansion when
breathing. Similarly, intense interoceptive signals may hijack ex-
teroceptive pathways to dominate conscious representation, e.g., the
referred pain of cardiac ischemia that is felt on the chest, neck and
shoulder (Garfinkel et al., 2016a). Integrative crosstalk between af-
ferent streams of interoceptive information begins with peripheral au-
tonomic ganglia and continues within spinal cord into the brain. In-
teroceptive information is projected through medullary relays (nucleus
of solitary tract), pontine hubs (parabrachial nucleus), thalamus (pos-
teroventromedial nucleus) into representations within insular cortex
(Craig, 2002). Throughout, ascending interoceptive signals share re-
gional neural substrates and interact with descending signals that drive
autonomic and humoral responses.
Notably, however, interoceptive pathways originating in peripheral
autonomic ganglia, and traversing spinal cord, brainstem and thalamus
to form representations in the insula (Craig, 2002) are only one of many
interoceptive pathways within the highly complex neural connections
that support extensive brain-body interactions. For example, in the
brainstem, interoceptive afferents couple with ascending mono-
aminergic systems whose broad projections underpin thalamocortical
arousal, attentional filtering and salience processing. There are parallel
subcortical (caudate, amygdala) and cingulate projections, where
neural information about bodily physiology can also shape behavior,
cognition and emotion (Critchley and Harrison, 2013). Hierarchical
representations with both upward and downward information flow
builds an architecture for the predictive representation of the internal
state of the body, which provides a powerful account of emotional
control, and dynamical self-representation (‘material me’) which itself
may underpin the continuity of conscious experience (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015; Seth, 2013; Seth and Friston, 2016). However, organ-
specific information is also retained, with signal-selective representa-
tions that are present in insular cortex and associated ‘interoceptive’
cortices (Critchley and Harrison, 2013).
From Aristotle to James and Lange, peripheral emotion theories
propose that emotional behaviors and feelings are derived from internal
(visceral) sensations. Logically, people who are more sensitive to in-
teroceptive signals may experience stronger emotions or better emo-
tional control. Individual differences in interoception have been quan-
tified using questionnaires, and behavioral tests that either exploit
natural fluctuations in internal physiological signals, or that manipulate
organ physiology experimentally (Garfinkel et al., 2016a). Heartbeat
detection tasks have dominated objective attempts to quantify in-
dividual differences in interoceptive ability. These typically test an in-
dividual's ability to perceive their own heartbeats at rest, indicated by
counting, tapping or by judging heartbeat timing relative to an external
stimulus. The psychometric limitations of heartbeat detection tasks are
widely appreciated (Brener and Ring, 2016). However, with necessary
caution, data from these methods show strong predictive validity, and
have helped understand how interoception contributes to normal and
abnormal emotion (Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017). Recent systematic
refinements distinguish between (objective) task performance, (sub-
jective) report of, or confidence in interoceptive experience, and their
(metacognitive insight) correspondence (Garfinkel and Critchley,
2013). This operational framework for evaluating psychological access
to interoceptive sensations has been empirically validated and extended
to encompass earlier (precognitive) measures of individual differences
(e.g. influences of cardiac signals on threat processing) and higher-
order switching between interoceptive and exteroceptive representa-
tions (Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017).
The impact of interoceptive signals on emotional processes is best-
illustrated with respect to cardiovascular arousal, which is signaled by
the firing of arterial baroreceptors in the aorta and carotids with each
ventricular contraction of the heart. The timing and strength of each
heartbeat is conveyed from baroreceptor to brainstem via vagus and
glossopharyngeal nerves and inform the reflexive control of blood
pressure through the baroreflex. Cardiovascular arousal occurs through
‘top-down’ baroreflex suppression, allowing heart rate and blood
pressure to rise together. The impact of this cardiac interoceptive
channel on perceptual aspects of emotion can be tested by comparing
responses to brief stimuli presented around systole, when the baror-
eceptors are active, to stimuli presented at diastole, when the baror-
eceptors are quiescent. Generally, the heart signals inhibit sensory
processing such as pain or startle responses (e.g. Schulz et al., 2016).
However, these cardiac arousal signals selectively amplify the proces-
sing of threat, including the detection and perception of fear signals in
others (Garfinkel and Critchley, 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2014).
Other interoceptive axes are of course relevant to affect and emo-
tion. Glucose sensing, responses to inflammation and infection (e.g.
Harrison, 2017), respiratory sensations (e.g. dyspneic load, hypoxia,
hypercapnia), and gastrointestinal signals (microbiota, distention and
gastric motility (Mayer, 2011) have different levels of access to con-
scious perception but each can shape affective feelings, motivational
behaviors and emotional reactivity. Gastric interoception, tested with a
waterload test (van Dyck et al., 2016), carries emotion-relevant (as well
as food-relevant information) and even resting electrogastric rhythms
influence activity across affective cortices (Rebollo et al., 2018). Au-
tonomic responses in themselves are not always directly linked to in-
teroception; sweat gland control through electrodermal activity re-
flecting sudomotor nerves does not have reciprocal parallel afferents.
Arguably, feelings of arousal corresponding to electrodermal fluctua-
tion are not classically interoceptive. Across organ systems, there is
weak correspondence between behavioral tests of cardiac and re-
spiratory interoceptive accuracy, and training sensitivity in one axis
may not improve another (Garfinkel et al., 2016b). For example,
meditative practice generally has little impact on cardiac interoceptive
performance (although see Bornemann and Singer, 2017 with relevance
to emotion regulation).
Overall interoception provides a route through which the physio-
logical state, integrity and physical health of the body constrains the
repertoire of emotions and motivational behaviors that an individual
might experience. Moreover, body reactions to affective challenges
through feedback, guide and intensify emotional feelings to add salient
reinforcement to the emotional experience. The notion of interoception
as a body-to-brain phenomenon is increasingly conceptualized within a
predictive coding (Bayesian) framework wherein higher order ex-
pectations and beliefs concerning physiological state interact with af-
ferent signals to shape experience, guide behavior and control the in-
ternal state. These mechanisms are important for understanding normal
and abnormal emotions.
Fig. 1 depicts, in schematic form, some of the roles of interoception
in neural, cognitive and physiological processes involved in the initia-
tion and modulation of emotional responses. Fig. 2 depicts some of the
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anatomical pathways by which autonomic and other CNS efferents in-
fluence peripheral physiology and are, in turn, influenced by afferent
information from the periphery. In both Figs. 1 and 2, the putative
influence of top-down predictive mechanisms is indicated.
6.2. Interoception and pain
Adopting the more inclusive definition above (Craig, 2016), pain,
particularly pain of internal origin, can be classified as a form of in-
teroception (or ‘intero-perception’). Pain is both a sensation and a
feeling (Strigo and Craig, 2016) and this duality is reflected in its
neurobiology. Acute pain – a time-limited activation of the nociceptive
pathways – signals injury to the body and motivates protective action.
Chronic pain – ongoing activation of nociceptive pathways – involves
maladaptive functional and structural changes at multiple anatomical
levels, and complex interactions with and modulation by endocrine,
autonomic, and immune/inflammatory systems, and attentional and
emotion-processing regions in the brain.
At the epigenetic level, there is evidence that changes in DNA
methylation, histone acetylation and methylation, and miRNA expres-
sion – resulting in changes in gene expression and neural function –
contribute to sensitization of pain pathways (Descalzi et al., 2015;
Ligon et al., 2016). At the physiological level, nociceptor activation is
maintained by ongoing crosstalk between the HPA axis, the sympa-
thetic nervous system and the immune/inflammatory systems. Activa-
tion of these systems – and concurrent down-regulation of restorative
parasympathetic systems – facilitates a body-wide shift into a defensive,
pro-sympathetic, pro-inflammatory, pro-pain mode (Janig and Habler,
2000; Ji et al., 2016; Leung et al., 2016; Milligan and Watkins, 2009;
Schlereth and Birklein, 2008). In this defensive mode, immune/in-
flammatory cells situated in proximity to peripheral nociceptors and
within the central nervous system (e.g., spinal level), produce pro-in-
flammatory neuroactive signaling molecules, which activate nocicep-
tors and facilitate neuroplastic changes in pain pathways (peripheral
and central sensitization) (Kuner and Flor, 2017).
At the spinal level, there is mounting evidence for both functional
and structural plasticity changes in chronic pain (Kuner and Flor,
2017). At the brain level, there is evidence that neural networks
Fig. 1. Input and output of emotional response
programs and relation to affective feelings and
conscious access. Input from exteroceptive sti-
muli updates a representation of the external
environment (‘world model’) through cognitive
appraisal (e.g., expectation, context and
memory) to trigger emotional response pro-
grams. Affective feeling states are an important
further determinant and trigger of emotional
response programs. These feelings arise from
integrative representation of (conscious and
unconscious) afferent interoceptive informa-
tion of the internal physiological state of the
body, in relation to “top-down” predictive
models of the self. The outputs of emotional
response programs are adaptive behaviors and
internal changes in bodily state that serve to
support such behavior (allostasis; temporarily
changing physiological set-points to surpass
homeostatic boundaries). Viscerosensory (in-
teroceptive) feedback is judged against
homeostatic set-points to drive affective feel-
ings states and regulation of allostatic/homeo-
static balance. Prediction errors in inter-
oceptive signaling thus extends closed-loop
homeostatic reflex control to modify emotional
response programs to better accomplish output
goals and underpin affective feelings states.
Based upon Barrett and Simmons (2015), Craig
(2002), Critchley and Harrison (2013),
Damasio and Carvalho (2013).
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reorganize to a defensive pro-pain state of organization, one that
prioritizes salience of pain signals – the emotion of pain (Apkarian
et al., 2011; Vachon-Presseau et al., 2016). Network reorganization also
involves a maladaptive upregulation and engagement of emotion-pro-
cessing regions – prefrontal regions, the anterior insula, anterior cin-
gulate cortex, basal ganglia, thalamus, periaqueductal gray, post- and
pre-central gyri and inferior parietal lobe – in pain processing, thereby
amplifying the value of pain signals and maintaining the feeling of pain
(Kuner and Flor, 2017; Vachon-Presseau et al., 2016).
6.3. Interoception and disgust
Disgust functions as a gatekeeper to the body to shield it from
contamination with hazardous pathogens (Matchett and Davey, 1991).
Hence, the experience of disgust is associated with various bodily
sensations of expulsion, vomiting or nausea. Often, disgust demon-
strates as an overwhelming experience, whose presence is robust and
rapid but also subsides quickly (Rozin and Fallon, 1987). A sudden
experience of unpleasant physiological signals is likely to evoke in an
individual the awareness of feelings of disgust and inform them to
distance themselves from the source of disgust (e.g., taking a bite from a
rotten apple).
Although certain universal disgust stimuli exist (e.g., feces, vomit,
rotten food; Rozin and Fallon, 1987), what elicits disgust has evolved
into several domains which are largely shaped by culture, society and
personal experience. Thus, in addition to protecting individual health,
disgust also functions to signal dangers to the cohesion of the social
group as a whole. Disgust is then experienced toward transgressions of
social norms (e.g., racism, pedophilia, bank fraud or lying politicians).
Research showed that disgust indeed affects political preferences (i.e.,
conservatism; Billingsley et al., 2018) and drives moral convictions
(Schnall et al., 2008). Interestingly, physiological reactivity toward
various disgust elicitors all seem to be associated with the same psy-
chophysiological correlates of disgust (e.g., activation of levator labii;
van Overveld et al., 2009).
To facilitate survival, either of the self or the group as a whole,
disgust and interoceptive processes are intertwined. Similarly to pain
and empathy, disgust has consistently been linked with activation in the
insula (Critchley and Harrison, 2013; Garfinkel and Critchley, 2013;
Schienle et al., 2002). Activation of the insula is not disgust-specific
Fig. 2. Interoceptive feelings and emotions
result from interactions between autonomic
efferents, visceroceptive afferents, and their
respective expression as centrally-generated
descending predictions regarding intended
bodily state, and ascending feedback of pre-
diction errors. Depicted are a representative
subset of structures and neural pathways in-
volved in autonomic efferent outflow from the
CNS (black arrows), autonomic, viscerosensory
and somatosensory afferent information flow
originating in the periphery and re-represented
in forebrain (red arrows) and putative centrally
generated, bidirectional predictive pathways
for interoception, feelings and emotions (blue
arrows). For simplicity, only a limited depic-
tion of a complex connectivity is presented
(e.g., without horizontal interconnections).
Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
AIC, anterior insular cortex; BNST, bed nucleus
of the stria terminalis; DNV, dorsal nucleus of
the vagus; IML, intermediolateral cell column;
LC, locus coeruleus; MIC, middle insular
cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Namb,
nucleus ambiguus; OPFC, orbitofrontal cortex;
PAG, periaqueducal gray; PB, parabrachial
nucleus; PIC, posterior insular cortex; PVN,
periventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus;
RVLM, rostral ventrolateral medulla; S1, pri-
mary somatosensory cortex; SN, solitary nu-
cleus; VMb, ventromedial nucleus of the tha-
lamus; VMNpo, ventroposterior medial nucleus
of the thalamus; VS, ventral striatum. Based
upon Barrett and Simmons (2015), Craig
(2002), Critchley and Harrison (2013),
Damasio and Carvalho (2013). (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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(e.g., Schienle et al., 2002) but may instead be linked to interoceptive
awareness (Critchley et al., 2004). In support of this, patients with
dementia with decreased bilateral insula gray matter volume exhibited
disgusting behaviors and impairments in disgust recognition (Woolley
et al., 2015). Presumably due to impaired interoception of bodily sig-
nals related to disgust, such patients no longer recognized disgust and
were uninhibited in displaying disgusting behaviors. Further, in an-
other fMRI study, activity in the insular cortices predicted emotional
experiences of disgust (Harrison et al., 2010). These findings suggest
that afferent visceral signals are associated with dynamic, continuous
representations of physiological states in the insula and contribute to
autonomic control over emotional states like disgust.
6.4. Interoception and empathy, neural bases
Empathy is a basic human ability with affective and cognitive
components. As a multidimensional concept that involves an affective
and a cognitive level, empathy refers, respectively, to the ability to
share another individual's emotional states and to infer that individual's
experiential states (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). The latter in-
ferential ability, closely related to theory-of-mind constructs, may em-
ploy similar cycling of probabilistic inference with fed-back prediction
error that has been proposed for cognitive, perceptual and emotional
abilities (Saxe and Houlihan, 2017; Wu et al., 2018).
Bodily processes have been intimately linked to social-cognitive and
affective functions such as empathy. Indeed awareness of bodily pro-
cesses influences social awareness. Previous findings thus suggest that
there may be an interdependence between interoceptive sensitivity (IS)
and empathy, as demonstrated by empirical studies which investigated
the links between IS and either affective or cognitive empathic re-
sponses (Ernst et al., 2013; Fukushima et al., 2011; Handford et al.,
2013; Terasawa et al., 2014). The accurate perception of bodily states
and their representation shape both affective and cognitive empathy,
and afferent feedback from visceral activity may contribute to in-
ferences about the affective state of others. Indeed detecting one's in-
ternal body signals strongly contributes to the awareness of oneself and
is known to interact with emotional and cognitive processes.
As recently suggested, this perception enables us to be more em-
pathic and to evaluate the body experience that other individuals ex-
perience as being more intense (Grynberg and Pollatos, 2015). This
hypothesis is also coherent with the assumption that impaired access to
one's own emotional state and feelings is directly associated with im-
paired simulation of the other's emotional state and feelings, leading to
lower empathy.
However, people vary in the extent to which interoceptive signals
reach awareness. This trait component might modulate both the sub-
jective experience of emotion and subjects’ ability to distinguish ‘self’
from ‘other’ in multisensory contexts (Ainley et al., 2015). Specifically,
it was shown that, when viewing pictures depicting other individuals in
pain, greater IS (determined by a heartbeat perception task) was asso-
ciated with a greater estimated degree of pain (interpreted as re-
presenting cognitive empathy), as well as greater arousal and feelings of
compassion representing affective empathy (Grynberg and Pollatos,
2015; however, see Ainley et al., 2015). This shared circuit also enables
individuals to activate their own body representations of pain when
observing someone in pain, leading to stronger empathic responses
(Singer et al., 2009). Furthermore, IS contributes to emotional experi-
ence and psychophysiological response in terms of arousal: greater IS is
associated with higher ratings of arousal and with greater heart rate
deceleration in response to emotional stimuli that may induce an em-
pathic experience (Pollatos et al., 2007). In fact, IS, the subjective ex-
perience of emotions, and cardiovascular arousal are associated with
activation of similar brain regions (e.g., anterior insula and anterior
cingulate cortex) (Critchley et al., 2004; Ernst et al., 2013). Additional
neural substrates of empathy may include the brain's fronto-parietal
network of mirror neurons (Iacoboni, 2009), theory of mind networks
(Kanske et al., 2015) and the full complement of agranular cortices
(Barrett and Simmons, 2015). From the clinical perspective, it was
shown that greater IS is associated with lower levels of alexithymia
(Herbert et al., 2011). Increased activation in the above regions might
explain the associations between high IS, low levels of alexithymia, and
more intense emotional experience.
Finally, the potential impact of interoceptive awareness on the self/
other distinction was also considered in the motor domain, as a specific
form of “action empathic resonance” by focusing on action observation
and imitation behavior (Ainley et al., 2014). Indeed, in automatic
imitation, inhibition of imitation is a marker of an individual's success
in distinguishing internally generated motor representations from those
triggered by observing another individual's action. Potentially, high IS
involves stronger interoceptive representations of the consequences of
an action, implying higher empathy, greater motor reactivity in re-
sponse to observed action and hence a greater tendency to imitate.
6.5. Interoception and empathy, a psychosocial example with clinical
application
Empathy is a critical process for surviving effectively in a complex
society (Cripe and Frankel, 2017). Such empathic understanding is
based upon “body wisdom”, a distinct form of emotional intelligence
subserved by the insula and lower level structures of the interoceptive
network (Craig, 2009, 2011; Di Lernia et al., 2016). The posterior insula
serves as a primary sensory cortex for representation of afferent inter-
oceptive information that is re-represented, first, in the mid-insula
where it is integrated with exteroceptive information and then in the
anterior insula as more subjective, affect-laden sensations (Craig, 2002,
2009, 2016). This interoceptive network can generate an awareness of
the body, which, along with the cognitive understanding, can mirror
another's feelings resulting in the most genuine and clinically effective
expression of empathy.
In medicine, it has been necessary to train learners to be empathic.
Robert Smith and colleagues have developed an evidence-based pa-
tient-centered method for enhancing empathy in physicians (Fortin
et al., 2018; Smith et al., 1998), a method associated with high patient
satisfaction and improved health outcomes (Smith et al., 2006, 2009).
To be empathic, learners first elicit an emotion (“how does that
make you feel”) and then listen long enough to understand it (Fortin
et al., 2018). They then use variations of these empathic statements,
recalled by the mnemonic NURS: Name the emotion (“that's been sad
for you”), Understand the emotion (“I can sure understand that”), Re-
spect the emotion (“thanks for helping me understand, you’ve been
through a lot”), and Support the emotion (“We’ll work on this to-
gether”) (Fortin et al., 2018). Learners report that these empathic skills
not only improve their doctor-patient relationships but also their per-
sonal relationships with, for example, parents, friends, and spouses.
7. Stress, endocrine systems and emotion
7.1. HPA axis
From cellular to behavioral studies, psychological stress has been
extensively studied in the last decades to understand its causes, its
physiology, and its effects on the body and the brain. Novelty, un-
predictability, a decreased sense of control, and threat to one's ego are
the characteristics that have been identified as triggers of a stress re-
sponse (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004; Mason, 1968). Upon perception
of one of these characteristics, two stress systems are activated: the
sympathetic-adrenal-medullar (SAM) axis and the hypothalamic-pitui-
tary-adrenal (HPA) axis.
Stress triggers a quick reaction via the SAM system, where the hy-
pothalamus signals to the adrenal medulla, which secretes catechola-
mines, notably adrenaline and noradrenaline. In parallel, the hy-
pothalamus activates a slower system, the HPA axis. Corticotropin-
E.F. Pace-Schott, et al. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 103 (2019) 267–304
280
releasing hormone (CRH), released from the hypothalamus, binds to the
anterior pituitary, which in turns secretes adrenocorticotropin hormone
(ACTH). ACTH is released in the bloodstream and binds to its receptors
on the adrenal cortex, which then releases glucocorticoids (GCs; cortisol
being the main GC in humans). Recent discoveries suggest the presence,
in the CNS, of a third, extra-hypothalamic, stress system involving
noradrenergic and CRHergic signaling in structures such as the central
nucleus of the amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,
both part of the extended amygdala (Binder and Nemeroff, 2010;
George et al., 2012; Ketchesin et al., 2017; Koob, 2013; Muller et al.,
2003; Risbrough and Stein, 2006). This system may have particular
importance in maintaining anxious versus acutely fearful states (Davis
et al., 2010; Pole et al., 2009; Somerville et al., 2010).
GCs bind to mineralocorticoid receptors (MR or Type I) and glu-
cocorticoid receptors (GR or Type II). Type I has a higher affinity to GCs
than Type II (Reul and de Kloet, 1985). While Type I is mainly dis-
tributed in the limbic system, Type II is present in subcortical and
cortical structures (Diorio et al., 1993; McEwen et al., 1986, 1986;
McEwen et al., 1968; Meaney et al., 1985; Sanchez et al., 2000; Sarrieau
et al., 1988). Importantly, Type II receptors are also involved in the
negative feedback mechanism that regulates the HPA axis. In addition
to the negative feedback at the level of the pituitary and the hypotha-
lamus, the HPA axis is regulated by the hippocampus, the amygdala,
and the medial prefrontal cortex. The amygdala, known for its role in
fear detection, is the only one of the three regulators that activates the
HPA axis (Herman et al., 2005). In contrast, the prefrontal cortex and
the hippocampus play an inhibitory role on the HPA axis (Herman
et al., 2005).
Given the high density of GC receptors in the amygdala, the hip-
pocampus, and the prefrontal cortex, and the known cognitive functions
of these brain regions, the role of GCs on memory, emotion processing,
and emotion regulation has been extensively studied. Although stress
and emotions are distinct concepts, it is important to keep in mind that
they can both increase vigilance and arousal levels, and they can also
activate the hormonal stress systems.
Acute stress increases the level of vigilance and favors emotionally
charged responses to salient information. Acute stress also promotes
memory consolidation, which ultimately results in better memory for
emotional material than for neutral material (Cahill and McGaugh,
1995; Heuer and Reisberg, 1990). Studies have demonstrated that co-
activation of the hippocampus with the amygdala results in this po-
tentiated memory for emotional information (McGaugh et al., 1996;
Roozendaal et al., 2008). Importantly, although emotional material is
usually better remembered than neutral material, there are differences
between emotionally-charged memories and neutral ones. High arousal
levels result in a differential treatment of the environment where cen-
tral information seems to have an advantage over peripheral informa-
tion (Christianson and Loftus, 1991). Emotional information is also
better remembered after a delay than immediately after encoding,
whereas the neutral memories tend to decrease over time (Kleinsmith
and Kaplan, 1963).
The relationship between stress and interoception is complex and
bidirectional (Schulz and Vogele, 2015). Whereas the subjective ex-
perience of stress is reported largely in terms of somatic sensations,
chronic stress may dysregulate afferent interoceptive information
(Schulz and Vogele, 2015). Such abnormal interoception may be ex-
perienced in the form of augmented or fictive somatic sensations
(Schulz et al., 2013; Schulz and Vogele, 2015) or attenuated inter-
oceptive sensitivity, such as stress-induced hypophagia (Fairclough and
Goodwin, 2007). Other endocrine systems are involved in modulating
emotion perception and processing and, as in the case of stress hor-
mones, their effects on emotion may be exerted to a great extent via
effects of interoception on mood states.
7.2. Contribution of other endocrine systems
In addition to the HPA axis, hormones of the hypothalamic-pitui-
tary-gonadal (HPG) axis can play a significant role in emotional pro-
cessing and emotion regulation. In females, the end products of the HPG
axis are estradiol (E2) and progesterone (P4), whereas in males, this
hormone is testosterone (T). While other tissues in the body, such as
adipose tissue, can release precursors to steroid hormones, the primary
release sites are the ovaries in females and testes in males. E2 and T
provide negative feedback to the pituitary and the hypothalamus to
reduce further production of these hormones. In cycling females, E2
and P4 levels fluctuate – the midpoint of the cycle has high levels of E2,
causing ovulation. In the luteal phase of the cycle, E2 levels go into
withdrawal, which is often associated with anxiety and depression
during the few days leading up to menstruation (Nillni et al., 2011,
2015), and some women with high symptoms suffer from premenstrual
dysphoric disorder (PMDD) (Hantsoo and Epperson, 2015; Nillni et al.,
2011). Further, major lifespan changes in the hormonal milieu of fe-
males, such as puberty and menopause, are often related to emotional
lability (Hantsoo and Epperson, 2015; Santoro et al., 2015).
Evidence suggests that fluctuating E2 levels may influence physio-
logical and neural reactivity to threatening stimuli, providing one
possible mechanism for women's heightened risk of mood and anxiety
disorders. For example, trauma-exposed women with low E2 levels
(both naturally cycling and post-menopausal) show impaired fear reg-
ulation (Glover et al., 2013) and deficient extinction of fear (Glover
et al., 2012). Women with lower estrogen also show greater con-
nectivity between the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(Engman et al., 2016), a region associated with increased fear expres-
sion and arousal. On the other hand, in a brain imaging study of fear
conditioning and extinction, naturally cycling women during a high-
estrogen phase showed greater activation of fear-processing regions
than men or women with low estrogen levels (Hwang et al., 2015).
Similarly, pregnancy may be a particularly vulnerable time for females,
as circulating estrogens and cortisol increase over the course of preg-
nancy. A recent study showed that pregnant women reported greater
levels of anxiety symptoms than non-pregnant control women, and
showed impaired regulation of fear responses (Michopoulos et al.,
2014). Further studies are needed in order to investigate the possibility
of an inverted U-shaped dose response relationship between estrogen
and poor emotion regulation, and to outline whether there are specific
circumstances (e.g., pregnancy, menopause) in which high versus low
levels of E2 promote anxiety.
In addition to HPA and HPG endocrine axes, other hormones may be
relevant for emotion. Proteins found in blood, such as oxytocin, vaso-
pressin, neuropeptide Y (NPY), and pituitary adenylate cyclase-acti-
vating peptide (PACAP), can play a role in endocrine influences on
emotion. Oxytocin, colloquially known as the “love hormone” has been
associated with affiliative behavior between parents and infants, and
between male and female partners (Young et al., 2001). Oxytocin is
thought to promote attachment and is critical for early survival of
neonates (Rilling and Young, 2014). In contrast to oxytocin, vasopressin
seems to increase aggression and competition, especially in males
(Johnson and Young, 2017). Seminal work with monogamous voles has
pointed to this critical role of oxytocin and vasopressin (Johnson and
Young, 2017; Young et al., 1998). PACAP has been associated with the
stress response as it is also released by the hypothalamus and pituitary
in response to stress. Further, PACAP may interact with E2 levels in
females to increase symptoms of anxiety and posttraumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) (Mercer et al., 2016; Ressler et al., 2011). Neuropeptide Y
appears to promote resilience, especially in males. For example, NPY
levels are higher in special forces military with lower levels of distress
or cortisol levels (Morgan et al., 2000). Interoceptive effects of non-HPA
axis hormones have focused largely on oxytocin and vasopression
(Quattrocki and Friston, 2014; Rinaman, 2007). For example, oxytocin
circuits may normally generate interoceptive sensations that promote
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attachment. However, disruption of these circuits may increase vul-
nerability to mood and anxiety disorders (Hurlemann and Scheele,
2016) as well as the social deficits in autism (Quattrocki and Friston,
2014), the latter possibly associated with impaired predictive coding of
representations of emotions in self and others. However, Quattrocki and
Friston's hypothesis that abnormal development of the oxytocin system
leads to impaired interoceptive ability resulting in autistic symptoms
has been questioned by Brewer et al. (2015). These investigators in-
stead suggest that impaired interoception leads to alexithymia, a con-
dition that is not shared by all individuals with autism and which can
occur independently of autism. More recently, intranasal administra-
tion studies have implicated oxytocin in the control of switching at-
tention between interoceptive and specifically social exteroceptive cues
with exogenous oxytocin enhancing attention to the latter (Yao et al.,
2018). The Social Salience Hypothesis (Shamay-Tsoory and Abu-Akel,
2016) proposes that oxytocin increases sensitivity of mesolimbic re-
ward circuits to social stimuli and, depending on individual char-
acteristics, such an attentional shift can have highly variable behavioral
effects. For example, while generally reducing interoceptive accuracy in
alcohol users, oxytocin improved performance on a heartbeat dis-
crimination task requiring shifts between intero- and exteroception
only in heavy drinkers who are believed to specifically suffer difficulty
in making such shifts (Betka et al., 2018).
8. Reward system and emotion
All living beings pursue two essential biological objectives: their
own survival and the preservation of their species. Human behaviors
have evolved reward mechanisms that contribute to evolutionary fit-
ness with feelings of pleasure, motivating individuals to repeat actions
that increase the likelihood of survival and reproductive success.
Achieving these goals is based on the satisfaction of certain instincts
such as sexual behavior, nursing, eating and drinking behavior, that are
motivated by activation of the brain's reward mechanisms. Specifically,
rewards are positive reinforcements that increase the frequency of ap-
proach and goal-directed behavior. For instance, food and sex are the
primary rewarding stimuli that, by virtue of their intrinsic properties,
result in positive reinforcement. In general, rewards imply positive
hedonic consequences (pleasure), learning cues, and assigning value
and motivational status (salience). They generally contrast with nega-
tive reinforcement and punishments which increase the frequency of
withdrawal behavior.
The reward system is thus an indispensable element for life and
allowed the evolution of animals and humans. Moreover, it is funda-
mental for particular regions of the brain to assign an emotional/mo-
tivational valence to any stimuli (internal and external) by determining
whether they are rewarding and should be approached or are aversive
and should be avoided.
Reward mechanisms are supported by specific neuroanatomical and
neurophysiological circuits that consist of two components – a
“wanting” or incentive salience system and a “liking” system (Berridge
and Robinson, 2016). Mesolimbic dopaminergic pathways are the
major substrates of incentive salience for natural reward behaviors
(Schultz, 2015). The central feature of the incentive salience circuit is
the release of dopamine (DA) from the ventral tegmental area (VTA)
neurons into limbic brain regions that control perception and prediction
of rewarding stimuli. VTA neurons have major projections to the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) and to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), but also
project to the hippocampus, amygdala, and several other forebrain re-
gions. This mesolimbic circuit is distinct from circuits that generate
pleasure (“liking”) which rely on smaller, more diffuse neural loci ac-
tivated by a variety of neurotransmitters (e.g., opioids) (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2015; Berridge and Robinson, 2016). Together these sys-
tems integrate information that drives processing and storage of
memories and decision-making by the hippocampal formation and
prefrontal cortex respectively. And both are involved in reward-related
emotions and reinforcement-based learning (Schultz, 2015).
According to Gray's BIS–BAS model, limbic circuitry generates
emotions that are relevant to approach (reward) and withdrawal (in-
hibition) behaviors (Gray, 1981). The behavioral activation system
(BAS) activates behavior in response to conditioned, rewarding and
non-punishment stimuli. BAS is mediated by dopaminergic pathways
from the VTA to the ventral striatum (Fowles, 1994). In contrast, the
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) seems to inhibit behavior in response
to novel stimuli which are feared and aversive, thus the BIS is re-
sponsive to non-reward stimuli, preventing individuals from negative or
painful outcomes.
Internal or external conditions may maladaptively increase reward
processing to induce disorders such as overeating or addiction to drugs
or sex. Conversely, deficiency in reward processing contributes to the
anhedonic symptoms of mood disorders like depression (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2015). Thus deficits and maladaptive responses of the
network of interconnected brain regions responsible for reward pro-
cessing and motivated behavior underlie a variety emotional disorders
(Harmon-Jones and Allen, 1997).
In the addictions, alterations of the brain's motivation and reward
systems result in persistence of maladaptive behaviors. Salience attri-
bution is biased toward rewarding stimuli and addictive behavior is
exacerbated by neurocognitive impairments as well as compromised
metacognition and self-awareness (Goldstein and Volkow, 2002). Ad-
diction patients are characterized by insensitivity to future con-
sequences (Bechara, 2005); they are unaware of future positive or ne-
gative consequences since they are driven by immediate rewards.
Behavioral addictions such as pathological gambling behavior or in-
ternet addiction disorder share the same dysfunction in reward me-
chanisms and cognitive control present in substance use disorders
(Reuter et al., 2005).
Finally, it has been demonstrated that normal levels of BAS func-
tionally affects a positive emotional attitude, but extreme levels of BAS
are linked to impulsivity disorders, Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, excessive risk-taking and antisocial behavior. In contrast, the
BIS system appears to be preferentially activated by stimuli conditioned
as being aversive, thus the BIS is responsive to non-reward stimuli,
preventing individuals from negative or painful outcomes. A dysfunc-
tion in the direction of hyperactivity of this system could generate
pathological disorders such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder or
Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder. It was also recently demonstrated that
stress-induced changes in reward network activity underlying both
normal and pathological behavior also may cause changes in gene ex-
pression (Manning et al., 2017).
Both neural arms of reward systems circuitry (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2015) – the dopaminergic mesolimbic incentive salience
circuit and the more diffuse system that produces the hedonic experi-
ence of reward – produce introceptive sensations experienced as urges/
craving and physical pleasure respectively (Berridge and Kringelbach,
2015). These sensations play a key role in maintaining addictive be-
havior (Paulus and Stewart, 2014; Paulus et al., 2009). Specifically,
changed physiological conditions as a result of addiction may alter the
reward value of stimuli (alliesthesia) such that behaviors that would
previously be aversive or neutral become rewarding (Paulus et al.,
2009). For example, excessive stimulation of reward circuitry may
favor continued drug use to avoid aversive states (negative reinforce-
ment) resulting from allostatic potentiation of stress circuitry (George
et al., 2012; Koob, 2013).
9. Immune system and emotion
Being sick involves many feelings, especially body feelings such as
fatigue, soreness, nausea, headache, and chills. Together, these words
describe the broad feeling of “sickness.” The study of the feeling of
sickness is somewhat unique, as it lies at the intersection of psychology,
neuroscience, and immunology – a relatively new field known as
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psychoneuroimmunology (Ader et al., 1991; Maier et al., 1994). Here,
we briefly review the science behind the feelings of sickness, referred to
as sickness behavior or the sickness response (Dantzer and Kelley,
2007), which have intriguing implications for the relationship between
inflammation and psychopathology.
The vertebrate immune system can be described according to two
divisions: the acquired immune system and innate immune system. The
acquired immune system responds to newly-contacted pathogens by
creating antibodies and then storing an immunological memory. The
innate immune system, on the other hand, is the more evolutionarily
ancient division that responds in basically the same fashion to every
pathogen or immune challenge. The behavioral component of this in-
nate immune response evolved to ensure that the body's resources are
diverted toward dealing with immune challenges. This is largely ac-
complished by triggering the subjective feeling of being sick, which
inhibits motivation to engage in energy-expending behaviors (e.g.,
feelings of fatigue and soreness prioritize rest). Here, we will describe
one key pathway by which foreign pathogens can affect behavior and
subjective feelings: cytokine-to-vagus-to-brain.
When local or circulating innate immune cells such as macrophages
or monocytes recognize a foreign antigen, they release both lipid and
protein signaling molecules. Important examples of proteins crucial to
the “sickness response” are proinflammatory cytokines (Dantzer and
Kelley, 2007; Kelley et al., 2003; Watkins and Maier, 2000). Proin-
flammatory cytokines are a class of proteins that function as innate
immune system signaling molecules, and include interleukins (IL) such
as IL-1beta and IL-6 as well as tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-alpha).
Proinflammatory cytokine signaling after infection is communicated
to the brain via different pathways (Miller and Raison, 2016), often
broken down into “humoral pathway” (cytokines flow through blood to
affect the brain) and “neural pathway” (cytokines are detected by
nerves to affect the brain). In the humoral pathway, peripheral cyto-
kines cross into the brain side of the blood–brain barrier via diffusion
across circumventricular organs and via soluble transport molecules.
However, cytokines are relatively large, hydrophilic polypeptide pro-
tein molecules and therefore do not easily passively diffuse in large
quantities across the blood–brain barrier. Furthermore, cytokines are
not generally released in large enough quantity to act in an endocrine
fashion (the term “interleukin” literally means “among white blood
cells”).
The neural pathway allows for direct and rapid communication
between peripheral immune response and brain. Upon detection of
proinflammatory cytokines by chemoreceptors on the afferent vagus
nerve (and to a lesser extent, the trigeminal nerve), an afferent signal to
the brain triggers sickness feelings. We know this mechanism from a
series of clever, programmatic animal model studies reviewed in detail
elsewhere (e.g., Goehler et al., 2000; VanElzakker, 2013). For example,
when an immunogenic substance like lipopolysaccharide (LPS, an ad-
juvant that triggers an innate immune response by mimicking bacteria)
is injected into a rat, the rat “acts sick” – it moves around less, socializes
less, and shows evidence of pain sensitization and fever. However, these
“sickness behaviors” are not expressed if the vagus nerve is cut (Maier
et al., 1998). In essence: without a functioning sensory vagus nerve, the
rat's brain does not know that its body is sick. The central nervous
system therefore uses vagus and trigeminal nerves as sensory organs to
monitor the peripheral immune milieu in order to trigger sickness
feelings.
In rodents, we can only measure the behavioral and objective
physiological changes that result from immune challenge but we can
ask human study participants about subjective feelings. Immune ad-
juvant injection into the human bloodstream leads to sickness feelings
such as fatigue, headache, and muscle pain (Eisenberger et al., 2010;
Hannestad et al., 2011; Reichenberg et al., 2001; Sandiego et al., 2015),
even when the immune adjuvant does not easily cross the blood-brain
barrier.
Infectious illness also often coincides with feelings of anxiety
(Goehler et al., 2007), and the shared pathways between inflammatory
signaling and stress-related signaling may be an important reason. The
vagus nerve is central to both immune signaling but also stress sig-
naling. For example, adrenaline (epinephrine) does not easily cross the
blood–brain barrier and its effect on the brain is largely due to its de-
tection by the vagus nerve. These overlapping pathways make sense,
given the evolutionary likelihood of environmental threat coinciding
with physical injury and subsequent infection (Miller and Raison,
2016). Regions such as anterior cingulate cortex, insular cortex, bed
nucleus of stria terminalis, amygdala, and hypothalamus are known to
be involved in both emotional states like stress and anxiety, as well as
viscerosensory signals related to sickness, pain, and hunger.
Glial cells such as microglia, astrocytes, and oligodendrocytes are
the neuroimmune cells of the central nervous system and affect the
activity of neurons depending on immune signaling. When microglia
(and probably to a lesser extent astrocytes) are activated by an immune
challenge or immune signaling, they “activate,” meaning they undergo
morphological and functional changes. The purpose of these activa-
tional changes is (1) to remove damaged cells via phagocytosis, (2) to
signal to other immune cells and (3) to support nearby neurons with
neuroexcitation (a response that can turn cytotoxic). During microglia
activation, the translocator protein is transcribed and translated. While
its specific function is not entirely understood, the translocator protein
is used as a biomarker for microglia activation in human imaging stu-
dies. Translocator protein positron emission tomography (PET) scan-
ning studies have provided evidence that a peripheral immune chal-
lenge that causes feeling of being sick is also associated with glial
activation on the brain side of the blood-brain barrier. Sandiego et al.
(2015) injected healthy humans with LPS, and found an increase in self-
reported sickness symptoms such as fatigue, headache, muscle pain
(soreness), and shivering, and a decrease in self-reported health-related
descriptors such as alertness, energy, focus, pep, and social interest. At
the same time, there was a significant upregulation of PET radioligand
binding of the translocator protein in a wide swath of brain structures,
including the caudate nucleus, cerebellum, and frontal and parietal
cortices.
Perhaps related to inflammatory processes, the translocator protein
is increased in neurological conditions such as Alzheimer's disease
(Kreisl et al., 2016), Parkinson's disease (Gerhardt, 2016), chronic fa-
tigue syndrome (Nakatomi et al., 2014), traumatic brain injury
(Folkersma et al., 2011), and multiple sclerosis (Park et al., 2015). In-
terestingly, the translocator protein is also over-expressed in psychiatric
disorders such as major depression and suicidal ideation (Holmes et al.,
2018) and schizophrenia (Selvaraj et al., 2018; see also Notter et al.,
2017; Barichello et al., 2017). As it becomes more and more clear that
inflammation, infection, and dysbiosis can play a role in neurological
and psychiatric disorders, these findings provide an interesting opening
into what may soon become an accepted truism: the immune response
is an important factor in cognitive, emotional, and mood symptoms of
brain-based disorders.
10. Consciousness and emotion
10.1. Emotional expression and experience under reduced consciousness
Patients sustaining severe brain injury may be unconscious for some
time, quickly regain full consciousness, or remain in an altered state of
consciousness temporarily or permanently. Unresponsive patients are
awake but not aware, they only show reflex movements (Laureys et al.,
2010). Minimally conscious patients present signs of awareness such as
visual pursuit or responses to command (Giacino et al., 2002) and they
can also perceive pain (Boly et al., 2008). Once patients achieve func-
tional communication or object-use, they are said to have emerged from
the minimally conscious state.
By definition, patients with disorders of consciousness are unable to
accurately communicate, and hence, it is impossible for them to express
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their feelings. Studying emotional states in this population is thus very
challenging. There is also little evidence to date to attest that behaviors
like grimaces or cries are related to a specific emotional state in these
patients. Indeed, these behaviors can follow pathological activation of
subcortical pathways and may be unrelated to emotional situation or
painful stimulation. Only if these behaviors are contextualized and re-
peated, one can infer that they represent a conscious emotional state.
Neuroimaging techniques have been gradually used to measure
brain activity in patients with disorders of consciousness. Active para-
digm studies have shown that brain activation patterns indicating re-
sponses to command can be found in around 10–20% of patients with
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (Cruse et al., 2012; Monti et al.,
2010). Some unresponsive patients may also retain residual emotional
abilities to react to the signals of pain in others (Yu et al., 2013). In a
recent study, a patient diagnosed with an unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome exhibited intact emotional responses to jokes as assessed by
recordings of facial electromyography (Fiacconi and Owen, 2016). In
another study, post-comatose patients showed a larger skin con-
ductance response to auditory emotional stimuli as compared to neutral
sounds (Daltrozzo et al., 2010). Similarly, in one patient who received
central thalamic deep brain stimulation, modulations of oscillatory
thalamic activity were observed in response to the voices of her chil-
dren, which suggest an involvement of the central thalamus in pro-
cessing emotional information (Wojtecki et al., 2014). Familiar voices
also induced stronger EEG changes (i.e., alpha desynchronization) than
unfamiliar voices in a few patients with altered state of consciousness
(Del Giudice et al., 2016).
Other salient emotional stimuli have been employed in clinical
routines such as the patient's own face (with a mirror) and the patient's
own name. These two items elicit more behavioral responses than a
person moving into the room or the sound of a bell (Cheng et al., 2013;
Thonnard et al., 2014). At the brain level, the patient's own name has
been shown to elicit stronger brain activation than any other names in
patients with disorders of consciousness (Fellinger et al., 2011;
Schnakers et al., 2008).
Music is another important stimulus that has been increasingly
employed at the bedside of severely brain-injured patients. Emotionally
pleasurable music can activate the dopaminergic system (which is se-
verely impaired in these patients), by inducing changes in the limbic
and paralimbic system, which can bring beneficial effects on con-
sciousness recovery (Kotchoubey et al., 2015). Music has been shown to
enhance arousal and attention in some patients (O’Kelly et al., 2013). At
the neurophysiological level, music seems to decrease relative power of
slow EEG rhythms, increase EEG amplitude in the alpha and theta
bands, and enhance cerebral response to the patients’ own name (Castro
et al., 2015; O’Kelly et al., 2013; Sun and Chen, 2015). At the neuroi-
maging level, music therapy tends to increase metabolic brain activity
in the frontal, hippocampal and cerebellar areas, and to induce stronger
functional connectivity in the auditory network and the external
awareness network (Heine et al., 2015; Steinhoff et al., 2015). These
preliminary findings provide some evidence for positive effects of music
therapy interventions but these should be replicated in controlled stu-
dies on larger samples of patients.
Brain–heart interplay has also been recently investigated, mainly
showing that patients in minimally conscious state have higher heart
rate variability complexity compared to unresponsive patients during
rest and after noxious stimulations (Leo et al., 2016; Riganello et al.,
2018, 2019; Tobaldini et al., 2018). The complexity of heart rate
variability has also been correlated to brain connectivity in the central
autonomic networks as measured with resting state fMRI (Riganello
et al., 2018). In a cohort of 127 patients who were presented with
auditory oddball stimuli, heart rate and heart rate variability were
however not different between these two patients’ groups, but global
regularities induced a phase shift of the cardiac cycle only in minimally
conscious patients (i.e., shorter interval between the auditory stimula-
tion and the following R peak when there was a violation of the
auditory rule) (Raimondo et al., 2017). These findings suggest a link
between residual cognitive processing and the modulation of auto-
nomic somatic responses, with less complex autonomic response in
unresponsive patients, and thus a potential way to differentiate be-
tween conscious and unconscious patients. Heart rate variability may
also reflect the affective and physiological aspects of pain in this patient
population.
All in all, research on emotions in altered state of consciousness
after brain injury is still scarce and needs more investigations. The
degree of preservation of interoceptive awareness in reduced conscious
states is a challenging but important question. The notion of nocicep-
tion as relatively preserved is implied in testing for response to pain
stimuli. In addition, responses to musical interventions, when present,
may also suggest relative preservation of hedonic experiences which, as
described above, have a strong interoceptive component. To examine
normal physiological states of reduced consciousness, sleep can provide
us with additional insight.
10.2. Sleep, dreaming and emotion
Emotional experience is a ubiquitous component of dreams (Merritt
et al., 1994; Nielsen and Levin, 2007). Although dreaming occurs
throughout sleep (Nielsen, 2000), awakenings from REM sleep show
greater frequency of dream recall and result in longer, more vivid and
more emotional dream reports (Hobson et al., 2000). Positron emission
tomography (PET) studies have identified a distinct midline anterior
paralimbic area that becomes selectively activated during REM sleep,
often to levels similar to or exceeding waking, following the more
widespread forebrain deactivation (relative to wakefuness) during
NREM sleep (Braun et al., 1997, 1998; Maquet et al., 1996; Nofzinger
et al., 1997, 2004, reviewed in Maquet et al., 2005; Pace-Schott and
Picchioni, 2017; Perogamvros et al., 2013). This REM activation area
encompasses many of the structures implicated in the experience and
expression of emotion including circuitry controlling fear and fear
regulation, reward and social cognition and instinctive, evolutionarily
important emotions such as aggression, anger and fear (reviewed in
Desseilles et al., 2010; Hobson et al., 2000; Pace-Schott et al., 2015a;
Pace-Schott and Picchioni, 2017). Emotions perceived during dreaming
have been characterized as predominantly negative and focused on fear
and anxiety (Merritt et al., 1994; Nielsen et al., 1991; Revonsuo, 2000)
although it has also been argued that positive emotions are under-
estimated due to the powerfully biasing effects of negative salience on
dream recall (Fosse et al., 2001; Schredl and Doll, 1998). Dreamed
emotions often qualitatively differ from the same emotions in wake-
fulness. For example, nightmares clearly represent an intensification of
fear and anxiety (Levin and Nielsen, 2007). However, it is also common
to dream of circumstances that would elicit strong emotion in wake-
fulness but produce little emotional response in the dream (Foulkes
et al., 1988). It has been suggested that reduced emotionality results
from REM atonia and the absence of motoric feedback (Perlis and
Nielsen, 1993), or from active prefrontal inhibition akin to extinction
memory (Levin and Nielsen, 2007). Additionally, there is reduction of
homeostatic regulation of autonomic (respiratory, cardiovascular,
thermal) physiology during REM (Parmeggiani, 1985) that may simi-
larly reduce afferent feedback from the periphery to interoceptive re-
gions of the CNS. During sleep, and especially REM, in the absence of
afferent input from the periphery, cortically generated predictions of
sensory percepts generate the inferred virtual reality that cannot be
modified by prediction errors resulting from exteroception (Hobson and
Friston, 2012; Hobson et al., 2014). In this regard, it is notable that the
sensory composition of dreams is strongly weighted toward hallucina-
tion of the exteroceptive visual sense (Hobson et al., 2000) and re-
markably underrepresented by the chemical senses such as gustation or
olfaction (Zadra et al., 1998). Nonetheless, the relatively common ex-
perience of movement in dreams suggests that fictive proprioceptive
sensations are also hallucinated (Hobson and Friston, 2012; Hobson
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et al., 2014; Porte and Hobson, 1996). Strong interoceptive sensations,
such as painful stimuli, may be incorporated into dream scenarios al-
though with a frequency much less than what would be expected based
upon waking experience (Nielsen et al., 1993; Raymond et al., 2002).
As in the case of fictive exteroception, interoceptive and emotional
states may continue to be generated by the selectively activated agra-
nular cortices (which make up much of the anterior paralimbic REM-
activation area). In this regard, the dearth of interoceptive sensation in
dreams is puzzling.
11. Physiological mechanisms of emotion regulation
11.1. Conscious emotion regulation
Emotions often serve a practical purpose (e.g., conveying important
information about the environment and triggering appropriate phy-
siological responses). However, sometimes emotions need to be con-
trolled in order to improve the wellbeing of the individual feeling the
emotion or to allow the individual to achieve social goals. It is im-
portant to understand how emotions can be regulated, either explicitly
or implicitly, and how attempts at emotion regulation may affect the
individual. Emotion regulation involves all the skills and abilities which
individuals use to increase, maintain or decrease experienced emotions.
A comprehensive definition states that emotion regulation is “the pro-
cess of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the
occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states,
emotion-related physiological, attentional processes, motivational
states, and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion in the service of
accomplishing affect-related biological or social adaptation or
achieving individual goals.” (Eisenberg and Spinrad, 2004).
According to Gross (1998b), individuals can apply these emotion
regulation strategies consciously, but may also have learned via prior
experiences to automatically respond to the occurrence of emotions in a
certain way. Emotional self-regulatory processes can influence emo-
tions at any stage of the emotion generative process. Gross proposed the
Process Model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b; John and Gross,
2004), which divides emotion regulation into the two broad categories
of “antecedent-focused” and “response-focused” strategies. Antecedent-
focused strategies include processes enacted before an emotion is fully
experienced (e.g., reappraising an emotional experience) whereas re-
sponse-focused strategies are enacted after the emotion has already
been felt (e.g., masking a facial display; Gross, 1998b).
Three representative types of emotion regulation are cognitive
strategies, mindfulness training, and biofeedback all three of which,
and especially the latter two, are extensively used to treat emotional
distress or pathology in the clinic. Cognitive strategies facilitate pro-
cessing and management of emotional information and are often em-
ployed spontaneously as part of an individual's coping strategies. The
most well-studied cognitive strategies are cognitive re-appraisal and
expressive suppression (Gross, 2007). Cognitive re-appraisal, a main-
stay of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), refers to the ability of the
individual to view emotion-inducing stimuli in such a way that their
emotional meaning is changed. In other words, altering the emotional
impact by learning to view emotional events from a different perspec-
tive and re-interpret their significance. Expressive suppression refers to
the ability of the individual to inhibit, change or mask the expression of
individual emotions. Unlike reappraisal, suppression can generate ad-
verse physical and psychological responses (e.g. heightened stress).
Following the Process Model, re-appraisal can be seen as antecedent-
focused whereas expressive suppression is response-focused (Richards
and Gross, 2000).
Clinically, cognitive re-appraisal is associated with positive effects
on various domains, such as smoking cessation (Kober et al., 2010),
decreasing impulsive buying (van Overveld, 2016), reducing risk-taking
(Heilman et al., 2010), and improving sexual functioning (van Overveld
and Borg, 2015) or task focus (Wallace et al., 2009). In contrast,
expressive suppression can have negative effects (e.g., Richards and
Gross, 2000), which supports the view that response focused strategies
like suppression drain cognitive resources significantly more compared
to antecedent focused strategies (Richards and Gross, 2000).
Another type of learned emotion regulation is achieved through
mindfulness training. Mindfulness is defined as a ‘state of non-judg-
mental, present-oriented awareness with a high degree of acknowl-
edgment and acceptance of emerging emotions and thoughts’ (Kabat-
Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness training involves training exercises from
Buddhist traditions but stripped of their philosophical and religious
contexts. Overall, mindfulness training teaches individuals to become
more aware of existing thoughts and emotions, and manage them
properly. It is commonly offered in structured programs which require
weeks of intensive training and practice, guided by a coach in weekly
sessions (Segal et al., 2002). In academic studies, mindfulness training
is consistently associated with positive effects on emotion regulation
(Chiesa et al., 2013; Holzel et al., 2011). Neuroscientific studies iden-
tified that mindfulness training was associated with improved brain
connectivity (Kilpatrick et al., 2011) and activity in structures related to
emotion regulation (Holzel et al., 2011). Interestingly, even brief in-
terventions (e.g. a single meditation session) already demonstrated
positive short-term effects (Chiesa et al., 2013; Leyland et al., 2019).
Mindfulness demonstrated positive effects on various behaviors, such as
stress (Chiesa and Serretti, 2009; Weinstein et al., 2009), depression
and anxiety (Blanck et al., 2017), weight loss (Ruffault et al., 2017), and
medication adherence (Salmoirago-Blotcher and Carey, 2018). While
generally mindfulness is associated with enhanced emotion regulation,
e.g., in negative affect (Khoury et al., 2015; Leyland et al., 2019), meta-
analyses also show that effect sizes vary significantly between studies
(e.g., Baer, 2003; Bohlmeijer et al., 2010). Further, it should be noted
that, in addition to emotion regulation, the full definition of mind-
fulness entails a wide range of skill trainings, from attention training, to
cognitive and emotional awareness, and meditations on compassion
and kindness. Consequently, author definitions of mindfulness vary
across studies. Unsurprisingly, mixed findings on the effects of mind-
fulness are thus also observed. Additionally, long-term effects, what in
particular constitutes the core ingredients of the efficacy of mindfulness
training or how mindfulness compares to other treatments in robust
randomized clinical trials have also yet to be established (Chiesa and
Serretti, 2009).
A third type of conscious emotion regulation uses biofeedback to
increase interoceptive awareness of physiological cues within the body.
Using physiological sensing technologies (e.g., ECG, skin conductance,
EEG), individuals learn to recognize physiological states as they occur
(e.g., increased heart rate, or sweating) and manage them effectively
utilizing this direct feedback. Studies show that improving inter-
oceptive skills is associated with enhanced emotion regulation skills.
For example, interoceptive training enhanced performance in financial
traders, whose job requires them to manage emotions effectively during
trading decisions (Kandasamy et al., 2016). While biofeedback is an
established method to strengthen weakened physiological processes
(e.g., hand strength weakness; Garcia-Hernandez et al., 2018), it can
also be used to affect psychological states, such as emotions (e.g., an-
xiety; Vitasari et al., 2011) or attention (Fehmi and Shor, 2013) and
thus provides a valuable tool in psychotherapy (Clough and Casey,
2011; Lehrer, 2018). Given the increasing availability of wearable de-
vices that focus on awareness of bodily cues (e.g., smartwatches that
measure heart rate or monitor sleep patterns), this research promises
promise increasing utility (e.g., self-treatment programs).
A shared component across these three trainable emotion regulation
strategies is emotional awareness. Emotion regulation requires re-
cognizing emotional states at an early stage. These strategies increase
awareness of interoceptive feelings that presage full expression of an
emotional experience, either by tuning sensitivity (e.g., mindfulness) or
in a technology assisted manner (e.g., biofeedback). This is an im-
portant and perhaps crucial feature of emotion regulation. Research
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shows that emotions affect our decision-making processes (e.g., Lerner
et al., 2004). Heightened emotional awareness can thus help in-
dividuals to properly manage their emotions before they can negatively
affect behavioral and cognitive processes.
11.2. Automatic emotion regulation
Although early research on emotion regulation asked participants to
consciously control their emotions using specific emotion-regulation
strategies (e.g., Gross, 1998b), later work began to focus on the effects
of automatic, or implicit, emotion regulation (e.g., Mauss et al.,
2007a,b; Schmeichel and Demaree, 2010). Automatic emotion regula-
tion (AER) is defined as, “goal-driven change to any aspect of one's
emotions without making a conscious decision to do so, without paying
attention to the process of regulating one's emotions, and without en-
gaging in deliberate control” (Mauss et al., 2007a, p. 3). Individuals
report using AER frequently (e.g., Gross et al., 2006), and yet are often
unaware when they are using AER strategies (e.g., Schmeichel and
Demaree, 2010). As a result, researchers should appreciate that the
influence of emotional stimuli can be both direct (i.e., reflecting emo-
tional reactivity) and indirect (e.g., reflecting emotion regulatory pro-
cesses; Kappas, 2011). It has been found that there are individual dif-
ferences in who is more likely to automatically regulate their emotions,
and that such regulation has both affective and physiological effects.
Some people are more likely than others to use AER. Individuals
with higher levels of RSA are more likely to automatically reappraise
emotional stimuli (e.g., Volokhov and Demaree, 2010). This is con-
sistent with the notion that RSA, also referred to as high frequency
heart rate variability (HF HRV), reflects self-regulatory ability (e.g.,
Thayer and Lane, 2000), and is also consistent with the finding that
people with higher RSA evince less negative affect displays to negative
emotional stimuli (i.e., they automatically regulate their facial expres-
sions; Demaree et al., 2006). RSA serves as an index of vagal or para-
sympathetic autonomic tone. By opposing the excitatory influence of
the sympathetic autonomic outflow (Porges, 2011; Porges and Carter,
2011), higher levels of RSA are believed to predict an enhanced abilty
to self-soothe and self-regulate stress. By definition, in AER, afferent
cardiovascular information would occur below the level of conscious-
ness. Interestingly, however, it has also been found that individuals
with better interoceptive perception display greater RSA in experi-
mental social interaction (Ferri et al., 2013). As a second example,
Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) found that people with greater
working memory capacity (WMC) are more likely to use AER strategies.
Specifically, people with higher WMC were more likely to claim having
knowledge of fictitious people, places, and things following ego threat,
and they felt emotionally more positive as a result of claiming such
knowledge. The notion that people with higher WMC are more likely to
effectively use emotion regulation strategies has been replicated (e.g.,
Bridgett et al., 2013; Hofmann et al., 2008; Thiruchselvam et al., 2012),
and is intuitively pleasing in that they would not only have better
cognitive outcomes (for a review, see Barrett et al., 2004), but also
better emotional ones. Notice here that not only are there differences in
terms of who uses AER (i.e., people with higher WMC), but there are
also different emotional trajectories/outcomes depending on whether
or not AER was used.
The use of AER also has profound affective and physiological effects.
Affectively, AER has been used to combat felt negative emotion coming
from such sources as ego threat (Schmeichel and Demaree, 2010), anger
provocation (Mauss et al., 2007b), and social exclusion (DeWall et al.,
2011). Affective effects include both reducing the impact of negative
emotional stimuli and enhancing recovery from the emotionally-salient
event (e.g., Demaree et al., 2006). Physiologically, it has been hy-
pothesized that antecedent AER strategies produce activation in the
orbitofrontal cortex, lateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortices, and
anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, whereas response-focused
AER strategies cause activation within the subcallosal anterior
cingulate and the cerebellum (Mauss et al., 2007a). The majority of
work in this area supports these hypotheses (e.g., Dörfel et al., 2014;
Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2012; Phillips et al.,
2008). AER strategies have also been examined in ERP studies of neural
activity, where AER instructions to increase or decrease emotional re-
sponses to emotional stimuli have been associated with corresponding
changes in late positive potential (LPP) amplitude, an index of sus-
tained attention to motivationally salient stimuli that is derived from
parietal and occipital neural regions (areas of visuo-attentional pro-
cessing) (Hajcak et al., 2010). In short, AER appears to effectively re-
duce both the affective and physiological effects of emotional stimuli –
but also recruits brain areas underlying the AER processes. This is also
consistent with the neurovisceral integration model, which proposes
that neural networks are flexibly recruited to integrate central and
autonomic emotional responses, with dynamic adjustments depending
on the appropriate response to the specific situational context
(Hagemann et al., 2003; Thayer and Lane, 2000, 2009). Along these
lines, there is evidence to suggest that HRV may be an index of the
integration of neural circuits that are important for guiding flexible
control over behavior via autonomic regulation (Thayer et al., 2012).
11.3. Autonomic self-regulation under conditions of safety and danger
Under conditions of safety, the sympathetic and parasympathetic
systems work together to maintain homeostasis (Wehrwein et al.,
2016). On a second to second basis, via afferent signals from all body
tissues, the brain is informed about the state of the body (Craig, 2003a).
Based upon this information, as well as on centrally generated efferent
predictions and their afferent prediction errors, the brain sends con-
tinuous signals to maintain the body's homeostatic environment.
Overall, the sympathetic system has a catabolic effect, causes the re-
lease and expending of energy and is associated with arousal, whereas
the parasympathetic system has an anabolic effect, increases saving and
storing of energy and is associated with rest and restoration. Sympa-
thetic efferents to body organs – the adrenal medulla (for secretion of
adrenaline/noradrenaline into the blood), the heart, smooth muscles in
the lungs, intestines and other viscera, and white and brown fat and
immune cells throughout the body – facilitate release of noradrenaline
to enable catabolic, energy expending responses, needed to maintain
body functions. For example, in the heart, activation of sympathetic
efferents to the heart leads to an increase in heart rate. Parasympathetic
efferents to body organs prioritize energy conservation and organ
maintenance (e.g., a low heart rate and high heart rate variability),
tissue regeneration and repair, down-regulation of immune and in-
flammatory responses, cell reproduction, and (coupled with the motor
system) a body state that facilitates close emotional connection with
significant others (Porges, 2011; Porges and Carter, 2011). For ex-
ample, activation of parasympathetic efferents to the heart leads to a
decrease in heart rate. Because of their complementary/dual roles,
under homeostatic conditions the sympathetic system is conceptualized
as the autonomic system accelerator and the parasympathetic system as
the autonomic system brake. Working in tandem with the motor, sen-
sory, immune-inflammatory systems and fat tissue, the sympathetic
accelerator and parasympathetic brake facilitate efficient utilization of
energy in life processes, a sustainable state and feelings of physical
wellbeing and close emotional connections to others. To appreciate the
complex anatomy of the autonomic system, how the sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous systems exert their many actions through
different body systems to maintain homeostasis, and the contribution of
different scientists and different theoretical viewpoints to shaping the
field, see Wehrwein et al. (2016). The differential modes of para-
sympathetic (vagal) function in safe and dangerous contexts, their
probable neural underpinnings and their relationship to the social en-
gagement system are detailed in the Polyvagal Theory (Porges, 2011).
In response to signals of danger, the sympathetic and para-
sympathetic systems shift into defensive mode, putting their
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complementary/dual roles aside. Danger signals (physiological, emo-
tional or cognitive) can activate the autonomic system either bottom up
(via interoceptive signals from the body) or top down (via sympathetic/
parasympathetic modulating regions in the insular cortex, medial pre-
frontal/anterior cingulate cortices, hippocampal formation and amyg-
dala) (Critchley et al., 2004; Gianaros et al., 2004; Strigo and Craig,
2016; Westerhaus and Loewy, 2001). Among these areas, the anterior
agranular cortices may specifically issue top-down commands based on
predictive coding (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Seth and Friston, 2016).
In defensive mode, the parasympathetic system withdraws homeostatic
signaling. For example, withdrawal of the parasympathetic brake to the
heart results in an immediate HR increase, with activation of the
sympathetic system mediating additional increases in HR. Increased
sympathetic outflow to the body also raises energy consumption and
vascular resistance in order to prepare the body for defensive action.
The parasympathetic system may now activate defensive programs –
fear-induced bradycardia in the heart; nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea
programs in the gut; expulsion of urine by the bladder – that work
alongside the sympathetic system to defend the body from danger
(Kozlowska et al., 2015; Wood et al., 1999). On the subjective level of
experience, depending on the pattern of activation, the individual may
experience homeostatic feelings of tension, heat, trembling, throbbing,
and sweating (sympathetic activation); or queasiness, nausea, and
peristaltic movements or wooziness, faintness, heaviness, and cold
(defensive parasympathetic activation to the gut and heart respec-
tively).
Release of noradrenaline in the brain results in the reconfiguration
of brain networks that prioritize reflexive modes of behavior (Arnsten,
2015; Hermans et al., 2011) and coordinates integrative defensive
programs by parallel activation of the autonomic efferent system, the
HPA axis, the somatomotor system and the immune-inflammatory
system (Janig and Habler, 2000; Westerhaus and Loewy, 2001; Wohleb
et al., 2014). If the danger is sufficiently severe, the innate defense
responses – hard-wired, automatically activated motor, autonomic, and
sensory responses mediated by subcortical neural circuits – may also be
activated. All innate programs involve an autonomic component, the
pattern of activation changing according to the response activated
(Kozlowska et al., 2015), which can be viewed as a form of AER. On the
subjective level of experience, depending on which innate defense re-
sponse is activated, the individual may experience intense feelings of
fear, anger, rage, disgust, paralysis or faintness, lassitude and torpor.
11.4. Homeostasis and allostasis
Chronic stress has been associated with higher risk of developing
various psychopathologies that are characterized by dysregulated pro-
cessing of emotional information, such as anxiety disorders, PTSD, and
depression (Juster et al., 2011; Marin et al., 2011; Raymond et al.,
2017; Wolf, 2008). Homeostasis refers to the organism's physiological
equilibrium and its ability to maintain this internal set point. On the
other hand, allostasis refers to the ability to re-establish homeostasis
through change (McEwen, 1998). This means that, because of en-
vironmental demands, the set point of a physiological system can be
modified by changes in other physiological systems and by behavior.
For example, chronic exposure to a stressful environment could modify
the ‘default’ emotional state of an individual. Pollack and colleagues
have shown that maltreated children detected angry facial expressions
more easily than control children (Pollak and Kistler, 2002). We could
hypothesize that both groups of children had a similar set point prior to
maltreatment exposure. Given that the environment of the maltreated
children was characterized by exposure to chronic stressors, the or-
ganism needed to adapt to maximize survival likelihood. Having a more
refined and rapid ability to detect emotionally-charged information
(i.e., angry faces) might carry an advantage for maltreated children.
Therefore, through an allostatic process, the initial set point of emotion
detection has been modified to adapt to the environment. This is just
one example where ‘modified cognitive processes’ serve adaptive pur-
poses. In the same vein, it has been shown that maltreated children
have higher amygdala volume (Lupien et al., 2011; Tottenham et al.,
2010). Given the role of the amygdala in emotion processing, this could
be an adaptive change to better deal with the environmental demands.
Allostatic processes that can change afferent interoceptive information
thus provide automatic emotion regulation to the extent that this in-
formation is either itself subjectively perceived as feelings, or it influ-
ences central circuits subserving experienced or predicted feelings and
emotions. In the short term, these modifications are usually beneficial
to physiological and emotional wellbeing. However, many allostatic
processes, when maintained over long periods, can add to what is
termed “allostatic load” which reflects the sum total of demands, en-
ergetic and otherwise, required to maintain homeostasis by compen-
satory mechanisms (McEwen, 1998; McEwen and Wingfield, 2003).
High levels of allostatic load can degrade the physiological substrates of
interoceptively perceived wellness and negatively impact feelings and
emotion.
11.5. Emotion regulation across the lifespan
Over the course of development, the processing of emotional ex-
perience changes with corresponding developmental changes in neural
circuits and CNS organization. Thus at different ages, individuals differ
in both emotional reactivity and in their ability to regulate emotion
(Goldsmith et al., 2008). At each stage in the development of emotion
regulatory capacity across the lifespan, interoception provides critical
feedback as to the success of different regulation strategies. For ex-
ample, in infancy, before cognitive development can support delib-
erative emotion regulation, interoception of reductions in physiological
discomfort teaches the infant which behaviors are effective at self-
soothing via negative reinforcement.
During early infancy, rudimentary forebrain inhibitory centers
begin to emerge, which alters behavioral and emotional changes in
response to the environment (Thompson, 1991). Early characteristics of
temperament, such as negative affect, also impact early emotion reg-
ulation processes (Calkins et al., 2002). For example, easily frustrated
infants have higher RSA than less easily frustrated infants, which may
reflect their greater level of emotional reactivity (Calkins et al., 2002).
This finding is critical in the developmental perspective of emotion
regulation because the ability to manage distress and anger when fru-
strated is critical for later adaptation, including the development of self-
control and social competence during childhood (Calkins et al., 2002).
Self-regulatory abilities develop in tandem with the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) during childhood (Pitskel et al., 2011). This develop-
mental process was highlighted by Levesque et al. (2004) who found
that greater prefrontal activation in children relative to adults during
the voluntary self-regulation of sadness may be related to the im-
maturity of the prefronto-limbic connections in childhood. Relatedly,
Lewis et al. (2006) suggested that inhibitory processes recruited for
emotion regulation involve differing cortical regions as children ma-
ture. Lastly, with regards to emotion regulation strategies, children
become better able to successfully regulate emotional responses uti-
lizing pretense as a cognitive reappraisal strategy, suggesting that the
ventromedial PFC attenuates amygdala and insula activation during the
down-regulation of emotion (Pitskel et al., 2011).
During the transition from childhood to adolescence, hormonal
changes and rapid brain development occur with the onset of puberty,
and socioemotional processes become more salient, as adolescents
begin to spend increased time with peers. On a physiological level, the
transition to adolescence is associated with greater subcortical re-
activity to affective facial displays, which may be associated with suc-
cessful regulation of emotional responses to one's environment and may
contribute to adaptive adolescent interpersonal functioning (Pfeifer
et al., 2011). The continuing development of the autonomic nervous
system and associated emotional processing abilities also contribute to
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enhanced emotion regulation ability during adolescence. Higher vag-
ally-mediated heart rate variability has demonstrated a strong asso-
ciation with external emotion regulation strategies, such as support
seeking, which are essential to the growth of the socioemotional pro-
cesses that are simultaneously being developed during adolescence (De
Witte et al., 2016).
The most widely studied emotion regulation strategies in young
adults are internal emotion regulation strategies, namely cognitive re-
appraisal and suppression. Previous research suggests that individuals
with normative development shift emotion regulation strategies from
the use of suppression to increased use of cognitive reappraisal as they
move into adulthood (John and Gross, 2004). Physiologically, the use
of suppression results in increased sympathetic activation in response to
an emotional event, whereas cognitive reappraisal does not produce
this effect (Gross, 1998a). As individuals age, this shift from the use of
suppression to cognitive reappraisal is physiologically beneficial, as the
physiological processes involved in suppression – particularly the sus-
tained sympathetic arousal – are physically demanding on the body and
could potentially have adverse long-term ramifications (Goldin et al.,
2008).
In older adults, extant emotion regulation literature suggests in-
dividuals develop a positivity bias as they age, which aids in creating
emotional stability. According to socioemotional selectivity theory, as
time horizons become shorter older adults reduce their number of social
contacts. This process is referred to as “social pruning,” which allows
older adults to maintain their closest, and most emotionally fulfilling
relationships, while removing less important relationships (Carstensen
et al., 2003). Additionally, socioemotional theory suggests that these
shifts in time perspectives also lead to changes in cognitive processing
of emotional information, including decreased memory for negative
images (Charles et al., 2003) and increased attentional bias for faces
expressing positive emotions (Mather and Carstensen, 2003).
Results from electrophysiological studies provide support for the
socioemotional selectivity theory's cognitive processing explanation of
the positivity bias, however, with different paths. Findings are mixed,
with some studies showing older adults have larger LPP amplitudes in
response to positive images only, and others showing a decrease in LPP
amplitudes for negative images, but no increase in LPP amplitudes for
positive images (Kisley et al., 2007; Meng et al., 2015). Deployment of
attention appears to be an important component of the positivity bias in
older adults, though results remain mixed in regards to whether there is
a decrease in attention and reactivity to negative stimuli only, or if
there is also a simultaneous increase in attention and reactivity to po-
sitive stimuli that concurrently work to produce the positivity bias in
older adults.
11.6. Physiological processes in dyadic relationships
Within close relationships, an individual's emotions are connected
to and affected by their partner's emotions. Given that the ANS is re-
lated to emotional expression and regulation and is implicated in social
interaction, it may provide a platform for dyadic influence on emotion
(Butler and Randall, 2013; Porges, 2009). Indeed, a growing body of
research suggests that interdependencies develop between the physio-
logic responses of close relationship partners through social interaction
(see Palumbo et al., 2017 for review). Throughout the lifespan, phy-
siologic linkages between partners are thought to provide a foundation
for connections between individuals who can aid in basic needs (Sbarra
and Hazan, 2008). There are several terms used in the literature to
describe physiologic linkage between partners such as “synchrony,”
“contagion,” and “coregulation.” The strength and frequency of phy-
siologic linkages across partners are not fundamentally good or bad;
rather the consequence depends on the context and the emotions in-
volved (Butler, 2011). Changes in one partner's physiology may lead to
increases or decreases in the other's physiology to promote regulation
and stability or result in dysregulation (Butler and Randall, 2013; Helm
et al., 2014).
Physiologic linkages develop between an infant and primary at-
tachment figure during social contact (Feldman, 2012). Over time, the
attachment figure scaffolds the infant's emerging emotion regulation
capacity (Gianino and Tronick, 1988). Studies have shown that infant
synchrony with an attachment figure predicted self-regulation and be-
havioral adaptation during childhood and capacity for empathy in
adolescence (Feldman, 2007a,b). Later in life within parent–child and
adult romantic relationships, the degree and direction of physiologic
linkage between partners has been associated with relationship sa-
tisfaction and individual psychopathology. For example, one study
showed that 60% of the variance in marital dissatisfaction was ac-
counted for by stronger physiologic linkage between partners during
conflict (Levenson and Gottman, 1983). Another study of mother-
daughter pairs showed that dyads’ physiologic responses during a po-
sitive interaction were negatively correlated for dyads in which both
mother and daughter had histories of depression and positively corre-
lated for dyads without histories of depression (Amole et al., 2017).
Although this area of research is relatively new, preliminary work
shows progress toward understanding the powerful influences of dyadic
relationships on physiology and emotion.
Achievement of developmental milestones of emotional regulation
in infancy, such as self-soothing, rely upon the child's use of inter-
oception to track changes in bodily sensations and discover their ability
to influence these sensations deliberately or via automatic processes
such as negative reinforcement. Physiological coupling may speed this
process by allowing a parent's physiological responses to “instruct”
those of the child. The next section will examine the phylogenetically
ancient forms of AER that are likely to be implicitly recruited very early
in life.
11.7. Extinction and habituation
An important element of emotion regulation is emotional memory
and its selective consolidation based upon valence, temperament,
biases, expectations and variations in individuals’ psychological needs
and issues. In addition to emotion regulatory strategies requiring
higher-level forms of cognition (e.g., reappraisal), emotional extremes
in humans are moderated by universal mammalian learning and
memory processes such as habituation and extinction – phylogeneti-
cally primitive forms non-associative and associative memory respec-
tively that function to down-regulate fear and anxiety. Such processes,
subserved by midline paralimbic circuitry, may in turn be recruited by
more advanced cognitive processes supported by lateral prefrontal
areas (Delgado et al., 2008). As such, these processes may represent the
most basic forms of emotion regulation in the animal kingdom. In ha-
bituation, behavioral and physiological responses during initial ex-
posure to a stimulus diminish with repeated presentations of that sti-
mulus (Grissom and Bhatnagar, 2009; Leussis and Bolivar, 2006;
Thompson and Spencer, 1966). In extinction, an organism learns that
stimuli that once signaled danger no longer do so (Hermans et al., 2006;
Quirk and Mueller, 2008). Both processes are adaptive in that they free
up limited energetic resources to confront new dangers or opportu-
nities. Additionally both processes result in neuroplastic changes that
can become memories if they are consolidated and later retrieved.
Rather than erasing a previously established association of a stimulus
with danger, extinction represents formation of a new memory that
competitively inhibits the previously established fear memory. In both
human and non-human mammals, fear and anxiety produce marked
physiological manifestations (such as activation of the sympathetic
nervous system) and behavioral signs (such as freezing) that diminish as
habituation and extinction moderate such fears. Although clearly de-
monstrated in experimental (e.g., fear conditioning) or psychother-
apeutic (e.g., exposure therapy) settings, it is important to recognize
that habituation and extinction are processes that are ongoing in the
course of everyday life. For example, individuals who display resilience
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and recovery, without any therapeutic intervention, following a psy-
chologically traumatic event, acquire extinction memories based upon
spontaneous encounters with reminders of the trauma (Pace-Schott
et al., 2015b).
The next section considers the role of sleep in emotion regulation.
Notably, important changes in sleep and circadian rhythms occur at
similar ages and developmental stages as changes in emotion regula-
tion. For example, across the first year of life, the basic sleep stages and
circadian rhythms, as well as the transition to more consolidated noc-
turnal sleep, develop and these are believed to reflect the extensive
synaptic genesis, pruning and circuit formation occurring during this
time (Davis et al., 2004). Similarly, in early adolescence, there is a
marked phase delay in sleep timing along with the beginning of a steep
decline in slow wave sleep (SWS) that may reflect the resumption of
synaptic pruning, myelination and hormonal changes (Crowley et al.,
2007). Across late adolescence and early adulthood the continued de-
cline in SWS may accompany the increasing myelination of frontal re-
gions (Kurth et al., 2010). Lastly, the greatly diminished proportion of
SWS, phase advance in sleep timing, and apparent decline in sleep need
accompany the neural changes of aging (Skeldon et al., 2016).
11.8. Sleep and emotion regulation
It is often hypothesized that sleep and dreaming play an emotion
regulatory role in healthy humans (Cartwright et al., 1998; Nielsen and
Levin, 2007; Walker and van der Helm, 2009). Such regulation may
become disrupted in mood and anxiety disorders and, conversely, sleep
disruption is increasingly seen as a contributor to the development of
such disorders (reviewed in Pace-Schott et al., 2015b). As previously
noted, an important element of human emotional regulation is the se-
lective encoding, consolidation and retrieval of emotional memory.
Sleep promotes memory consolidation in many domains (Rasch and
Born, 2013) and has consistently been shown to enhance consolidation
of emotional memory albeit with mixed findings as to whether sleep
preferentially augments emotional over neutral memories (reviewed in
Goldstein and Walker, 2014; Hutchison and Rathore, 2015; Kahn et al.,
2013; Pace-Schott, 2015; Palmer and Alfano, 2016; Tempesta et al.,
2017). For example, a night's sleep promotes consolidation and gen-
eralization of both habituation and extinction, and paralimbic circuits
controlling learning and memory of both fear and extinction overlap
with midline areas selectively activated in REM (Pace-Schott et al.,
2015a).
A night of sleep profoundly affects our emotional state and, in most
cases, will improve mood along with other subjective experiences of
mind-body wellness such as restedness, alertness and stamina. In part,
improved mood is to be expected from the 2-process model (Borbely,
1982) whereby sleep propensity results from an interaction between
sleep-homeostatic (Process S) and circadian (Process C) factors. Re-
garding Process S, sleep dissipates endogenous somnogens – substances
believed to accumulate in proportion to time spent awake. Adenosine is
the strongest candidate for such a substance (Porkka-Heiskanen and
Kalinchuk, 2011) but multiple cytokines may also play roles (Davis and
Krueger, 2012) especially when the immune system is challenged
(Haack et al., 2009b). Because endogenous somnogens promote drow-
siness, their dissipation would be alerting. Hormonal rhythms that are
under circadian control (Process C) such as the pre-awakening rise in
cortisol (Kalsbeek et al., 2012) and the associated cortisol awakening
response (Federenko et al., 2004), as well as, in men, a testosterone
morning acrophase (Diver et al., 2003), are believed to prepare us for
the challenges of the new day and could be expected to promote a sense
of vigor upon waking. The abrupt change from a nadir of mono-
aminergic (serotinergic, noradrenergic and histaminergic) neuromo-
dulation during REM sleep (abundant during the late sleep period) to
wakefulness, at which time they return to waking levels (Pace-Schott
and Hobson, 2002), may further promote a sense of renewed vigor.
Moreover, unlike cortisol itself, corticotropin releasing factor (CRF),
which acts centrally as an anxiogenic neurochemical (Heinrichs and
Koob, 2004), shows an evening acrophase and morning nadir in cere-
brospinal fluid (Kling et al., 1994).
Physiologically restorative functions of sleep, such as the homeo-
static equilibration of stress, reward, autonomic and neuroendocrine
systems, may play a key role in sleep's emotion regulatory effects. Close,
bidirectional coupling between sleep states and the autonomic nervous
system is suggested by the marked increase in parasympathetic outflow
during NREM, especially its deepest stage, SWS (de Zambotti et al.,
2018). The selective secretion of growth hormone at this same time
(Sassin et al., 1969) as well as the circadian nadir of plasma cortisol
(Kalsbeek et al., 2012) similarly suggests that SWS favors restorative,
anabolic processes. Other restorative processes linked to SWS include
restoration of synaptic homeostasis via downscaling of excess po-
tentiation generated during waking (Tononi and Cirelli, 2006) as well
as physical removal of metabolic wastes via the brain's glymphatic
system (Jessen et al., 2015). REM sleep may also serve physiologically
restorative functions. It has been suggested that the nadir of mono-
aminergic neurotransmission in REM may serve to restore receptor
sensitivity and, thus, the alerting effects of these neuromodulators
might be especially strong following nocturnal sleep (Rotenberg, 2006).
Alternatively, stress-related elevations of norepinephrine may be re-
duced by sleep, especially during REM, thereby promoting the sub-
jective experience of greater wellbeing upon awakening (Faraut et al.,
2015b).
In addition to direct effects on limbic circuitry, sleep-dependent
processes may regulate emotion by promoting homeostasis in physio-
logical processes sensed, during subsequent wakefulness, via our in-
teroceptive capacities (Craig, 2003a; Strigo and Craig, 2016). Such
processes include a remarkable number of physiological parameters
that are innervated in such a way that suggests they might contribute,
via interoception, to the spectrum of subjective feelings of wellbeing.
These include not only pain and temperature receptors but also meta-
boreceptors, hormone receptors, osmoreceptors, etc. (Craig, 2002).
Whereas some of these interoceptive inputs affect emotion indirectly or
below the level of consciousness (Craig, 2002), the experience of pain
eventually enters conscious awareness (Borsook et al., 2018), can
strongly influence mood and emotion (Lumley et al., 2011; Minami and
Ide, 2015; Mollet and Harrison, 2006), and is strongly modulated by
sleep amount and quality (Haack and Mullington, 2005; Haack et al.,
2009b).
Pro-inflammatory cytokines may contribute to such pain and dis-
comfort (see Section 9) and their elevation is associated with both sleep
disruption (Irwin et al., 2016) and circadian misalignment (Wright
et al., 2015). Notably, prostaglandins (PGs), interleukin-6 (IL-6) and
tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFα) have all been associated with in-
creased spontaneous pain symptoms following both sleep deprivation
and sleep restriction (Haack et al., 2007, 2009a,b; Haack and
Mullington, 2005).
Numerous studies have shown that elevation of both spontaneous
and evoked pain – hyperalgesia – is promoted by the sleep-deprived
state (Finan et al., 2013; Haack et al., 2009b; Kundermann et al., 2004;
Lautenbacher et al., 2006). Specifically, sleep deprivation may interfere
with descending opioidergic, serotonergic and dopaminergic brainstem
pain-modulating pathways and thus may underlie the hyperalgesia
produced by experimental sleep deprivation, as well as the bidirectional
exacerbation of sleep disturbance and pain in conditions such as fi-
bromyalgia (Choy, 2015; Haack et al., 2009b; Smith et al., 2007). No-
tably, napping has been shown to reverse hyperalgesia induced by sleep
restriction (Faraut et al., 2015a), possibly via reductions in proin-
flammatory cytokines such as IL-6 (Faraut et al., 2015b). The down-
regulation of proinflammatory cytokines by sleep may also prevent
mood disorders as increasing evidence points to elevated levels of C-
reactive protein (CRP) as well as IL-6 and TNFα in major depressive
disorder (Haapakoski et al., 2015).
Forebrain structures involved in both interoception and mood also
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show evidence of sleep-dependent modulation, the most striking being
the REM-associated selective activation of anterior midline limbic and
paralimbic structures that include areas involved in emotion and
emotion regulation such as the amygdala and vmPFC (Nofzinger et al.,
2004; Pace-Schott and Picchioni, 2017). This selective activation might
regulate emotion via memory consolidation (Pace-Schott et al., 2015a),
active processes taking place during dreaming (Nielsen and Levin,
2007), depotentiation of emotional components of memory (Walker
and van der Helm, 2009) as well as yet to be discovered mechanisms. A
prominent part of this REM-activated area is the insular cortex (Braun
et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997), a region believed to play a key role
in processing interoceptive information (Craig, 2002, 2009, 2011;
Namkung et al., 2017).
Less well-researched influences on emotion closely related to sleep
involve circadian rhythms. These include variation in individuals’ en-
dogenous circadian phase (controlled by the molecular clocks in the
suprachiasmatic nucleus) that is normally entrained to ambient light-
dark cycles. For example, “morningness-eveningness” – the degree to
which an individual favors early or late times of day to engage in wake-
related activities – reflects internal physiological rhythms, best indexed
by the rise in plasma melatonin proximal to bedtime (Adan et al.,
2012). Those with more pronounced evening preference (evening
types) show greater tendency toward neuroticism and greater risk for
anxiety and mood disorders (Adan et al., 2012). In addition, circadian
influences have been detected on positive affect (Murray et al., 2002),
reward motivation (Murray et al., 2009), sympathetic reactivity (Hot
et al., 2005) and extinction (Pace-Schott et al., 2013). The sensitivity of
human emotion to the environmental light–dark cycle is powerfully
illustrated by persons with seasonal affective disorder (Levitan, 2007;
Magnusson and Boivin, 2003). Recent work on circadian factors influ-
encing risk of affective disorders have revealed extensive interactions
between key emotion regulatory neurotransmitters such as dopamine
and the genes controlling the molecular circadian clock (McClung,
2007, 2011, 2013). Moreover, light itself has been demonstrated to
exert subtle influences on emotion mediated by the recently discovered
intrinsically photosensitive retinal ganglion cells expressing the pho-
topigment melanopsin (LeGates et al., 2012; LeGates et al., 2014).
Peripheral physiological systems also express circadian rhythmicity and
their misalignment with the environment (e.g., from jetlag) can result
in interoceptively sensed discomfort (e.g., gastrointestinal) that can, in
turn, negatively affect emotion (LeGates et al., 2014).
Abnormally high interoceptive sensitivity may underlie some of the
sleep difficulties in persons with insomnia (Ewing et al., 2017; Wei
et al., 2016). For example, compared with non-insomniac controls, in-
dividuals with Insomnia Disorder showed larger cortical evoked re-
sponses to their own heartbeat (Wei et al., 2016). Similarly, among
individuals with mood and anxiety disorders, poorer sleep quality was
associated with greater confidence in cardiac interoceptive sensitivity
(heartbeat detection) despite their objective interoceptive accuracy
showing the opposite relationship (Ewing et al., 2017). A recent fMRI
study examining human fear conditioning and extinction in primary
insomnia showed a delayed down-regulation of insula responses to
extinguished conditioned stimuli (Seo et al., 2018).
Much of the literature reviewed in this and other sections suggests
that the integrity and maintenance of homeostasis, not only in the CNS
and PNS but in all systems of the body (e.g., metabolic, cardiovascular,
immune), contributes to interoceptive feelings, moods and even to
consciously identified emotions. The integrated output of all these
systems may constitute an important, albeit highly complex, physiolo-
gical input to a central mechanism of emotional homeostasis that can be
facilitated or perturbed by a wide variety of changes in other homeo-
static systems. And sleep contributes to homeostasis in many of these
systems. We will next consider a few of the numerous neuropsychiatric
conditions in which relationships between physiology and emotion are
disordered and such abnormalities may be experienced via interocep-
tion.
12. Disorders of the relationship between physiology and emotion
12.1. Somatization
Ending in “viscerosensory” regions such as the insula, the inter-
oceptive network supports the “bottom-up” generation of many body
sensations, for example, itching, pain, and thirst (Craig, 2009, 2011;
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Di Lernia et al., 2016). Guided by inter-
oception, “visceromotor” structures, such as the subgenual anterior
cingulate cortex, can then modulate these body sensations and initiate
behaviors to restore homeostasis. Additionally such structures may be
able to predict and generate interoceptive feelings as well as homeo-
static changes in a “top-down” manner based upon prior experience
(Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Such modulation of interoceptive sen-
sations is of fundamental survival value in guiding humans away from
threats and toward rewards (Craig, 2011; Damasio, 1996). Overt
threats or opportunities prompt physical sensations that may become
conscious, be expressed verbally as feeling and emotions and provide
additional flexibility of responses to ensure organismic integrity.
Many believe chronic pain problems (pain with little or no basis in
tissue damage; Smith and Dwamena, 2007) can be explained by al-
terations in the top-down influences on the interoceptive network
(Craig, 2003b; Di Lernia et al., 2016; Tabor et al., 2017) or on heigh-
tened sensitivity to afferent interoceptive signaling (Krautwurst et al.,
2014; Krautwurst et al., 2016). While humans are hard-wired to some
extent, much emotional expression, including pain, is socially con-
structed and begins in childhood (Barrett, 2017a). Children who be-
come chronic pain patients often have experienced deviations from the
normal construction of pain experiences. For example, they may have
received attention only when having pain, others may have associated
the pain of early abuse (which is very prevalent; Fiddler et al., 2004)
with otherwise unavailable attention, and others may have seen
members of the family attended to only with physical symptoms.
This undue physical focus on pain interrupts the child's normal
transition from the physical expression of emotions in infancy to the
healthier verbal expression of emotions and feelings when language
develops (Schore, 2003). This impairment of normal psychological
growth and development is sometimes called alexithymia (an absence
of language for emotional states) (Levenson, 2005) or somatosensory
amplification (Koteles and Witthoft, 2017). Although certainly mala-
daptive in society, chronic pain patients are acting to offset perceived
threats to body integrity.
The greater the number and severity of pain symptoms, the more
likely depression and anxiety will co-occur and, unfortunately, enhance
pain perception (Kroenke, 2003). Of little or no value in chronic pain
(CDC, 2016), opioids often are prescribed and further magnify the pain
by aggravating depression and/or by inducing opiate hyperalgesia, the
latter a paradoxical worsening of pain resulting from narcotics (Servick,
2016). Undergirding the chronicity is that chronic pain and attendant
psychosocial distress can change the structure of the brain's widespread
cognitive and affective structures in ways that perpetuate pain per-
ception (Latremoliere and Woolf, 2009).
Treatment emphasizing the physician-patient relationship, motiva-
tional interviewing, cognitive-behavioral principles, and anti-
depressants has been shown effective at reducing medically un-
explained pain (Smith et al., 2003, 2009, 2014).
12.2. Neurological syndromes
Any neurological disease that directly or indirectly affects the limbic
system will induce emotional disturbances. For instance, patients who
sustained frontal brain lesions can present spasmodic laughs and cries,
while others can demonstrate gelastic or dacrystic seizures due to a
lesion in the hypothalamus. Patients with Parkinson's disease, syn-
dromes of dementia and with multiple sclerosis also present emotional
disorders including depression, anxiety, anger, euphoria and
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uncontrollable outbursts of crying or laughing (Rao et al., 1992).
Conversely, emotion can be hard to evaluate in patients with other
neurological deficits. Patients with locked-in syndrome are unable to
move and speak due the disruption of the cortico-spinal and cortico-
bulbar pathways, and the only way of communication is through eye
movements (Bruno et al., 2015). Despite the fact that this syndrome is
probably seen as one of the most scary of conditions, the majority of
chronic patients report a good quality of life (Bruno et al., 2015).
Akinetic mutism is another disorder defined as a total absence of
spontaneous behavior and speech with low emotional display in the
presence of preserved visual tracking (Marin and Wilkosz, 2005).
12.3. Sleep disorders
The sleep disorders offer insight into how dissociation between
arousal and consciousness may interact with the physiological substrate
of emotion (Mahowald et al., 2011). Three specific disorders may be
particularly instructive.
In Restless Leg Syndrome (RLS), an individual experiences un-
pleasant sensations, typically in the legs and emerging typically the
evening and intensifying while attempting sleep. One theory attributes
RLS sensations to deficient signaling from a small hypothalamic dopa-
minergic nucleus (A11) whose normal function is to facilitate inhibitory
control of dorsal horn sensory neurons in the spinal cord (Clemens
et al., 2006). The resulting imbalance of excitatory input and its in-
hibitory control may result a “focal akathesia” whereby normal base-
line, tonic sensory input from skeletal musculature is disinhibited and
thus perceived centrally as unpleasant afferent sensation.
Among emotional parasomnias, nightmares are typically not ac-
companied by extreme autonomic activation (Nielsen and Carr, 2017).
In contrast, in night terrors, intense autonomic activation arises in the
absence of a conscious precipitant or appraisal (Fisher et al., 1970,
1973). Nightmare disorder thus represents centrally generated emo-
tional experience without peripheral input whereas night terror re-
presents autonomically generated emotion in the absence of cognitive
awareness. Interestingly, increased autonomic activation emerges in
more severe trauma-related nightmares that are accompanied dis-
ruptive behavior suggestive of REM-sleep Behavior Disorder (RBD)
(Mysliwiec et al., 2018).
In RBD, dreamed behavior and emotions are enacted due to loss of
REM atonia. RBD dreams appear to contain abnormally high levels of
aggression (Fantini et al., 2005; but see D’Agostino et al., 2012;
Oudiette et al., 2009). Disinhibition of subcortical instinctual motor
generators (due to underlying synucleinopathy) may contribute to
elevated aggression. Excessive movements resulting from such disin-
hibition might, in turn, heighten dream emotion due to efferent copy
sensory feedback to cortical regions elaborating dream content
(Blumberg and Plumeau, 2015). Interestingly, individuals with RBD
often show prominent autonomic dysfunction (Chiaro et al., 2017;
Ferini-Strambi et al., 2014; Frauscher et al., 2012; Miglis et al., 2017).
12.4. Psychophysiological indices as markers of emotion dysfunction in
psychiatric disorders
Psychophysiological indices have been widely used to probe emo-
tional functioning across a variety of psychiatric populations, including
depression, anxiety, substance use disorders, and schizophrenia. A wide
variety of indices have been used in this regard, including cardiovas-
cular psychophysiology, peripheral physiology (e.g., skin conductance),
startle reflex, pupillometry, and electrophysiology (e.g., EEG, ERPs,
MEG). These measures have the advantage of providing a more objec-
tive measure of emotional responses relative to self-report measures
and can also be used to help elucidate the sequence of emotional re-
sponses at various levels of temporal resolution. Here we highlight
some examples of ways in which psychophysiology can highlight al-
terations in emotional functioning in psychiatric disorders, with a focus
on depression and PTSD.
12.4.1. Depression
Abnormalities in autonomic nervous system functioning have been
associated with depression. For example, major depressive disorder
(MDD) in adults has been repeatedly associated with low resting
parasympathetic nervous system activity, as indexed by resting levels of
RSA (Kemp et al., 2010; Kikuchi et al., 2009; Rottenberg et al., 2007;
Udupa et al., 2007), although these findings have not always been
consistent (e.g., Licht et al., 2008; Lehofer et al., 1997; Yeragani et al.,
1991). More consistent findings have been observed for RSA reactivity
in response to laboratory tasks, with depressed adults exhibiting
blunted RSA withdrawal to psychological stressors, such as a speech
task (Bylsma et al., 2014; Rottenberg et al., 2007), as well as physical
challenges, such as a handgrip task (Nugent et al., 2011). To a lesser
extent, abnormalities in sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity
have also been observed in MDD. For example, Salomon et al. (2009,
2013) found blunted sympathetic nervous system reactivity as indexed
by lengthened pre-ejection period (PEP) to a laboratory speech stressor
task, although others have also found shorter PEP in individuals with
depressive symptoms (Light et al., 1998). Overall, research thus far has
demonstrated mixed evidence of parasympathetic and sympathetic
deficits in depression. Low resting RSA and blunted RSA reactivity are
thought to reflect poor self-regulation (Balzarotti et al., 2017).
The majority of depression research has focused almost exclusively
on individual parasympathetic or sympathetic indices. However, con-
sideration of the dynamic interplay between sympathetic and para-
sympathetic regulation may be critically important for providing a
comprehensive understanding of behavioral and affective reactivity and
regulation (Berntson et al., 1991; Sunagawa et al., 1998). For example,
Bylsma et al. (2015) examined changes in cardiac autonomic balance
(CAB; Berntson et al., 2008) in response to psychological challenges in
youth with a history of juvenile-onset-depression and healthy controls
and found that while controls showed an expected shift from sympa-
thetic relative to parasympathetic activation in response to the stres-
sors, youth with a history of depression showed the opposite pattern.
Elsewhere, it has been found that atypical patterns of resting RSA and
RSA reactivity in youths with a history of juvenile-onset depression
predicted deficits in mood repair as assessed by both trait measures and
laboratory probes (Yaroslavsky et al., 2016). In addition, other work
has found that specific combinations of resting RSA and RSA reactivity
moderate the depressogenic effect of maladaptive mood repair
(Yaroslavsky et al., 2013).
Not surprisingly, ERP indices of affective processing have also been
associated with depression and depression risk. For example, depressed
adults show less of an increase in LPP amplitude to threatening faces
(Foti et al., 2011), suggesting that they are more sensitive to threa-
tening stimuli. High familial risk children (with at least one depressed
parent) also show a similar blunting in their LPP response to emotional
faces (Kujawa et al., 2012). Further, adults with both current and re-
mitted MDD have shown aberrant LPP changes following reappraisal
(Bylsma, 2012). The LPP has also been found to be associated with
depressive symptoms and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies in
healthy children (Dennis et al., 2009). Adults with current and remitted
depression (e.g., Foti and Hajcak, 2009), high risk older adolescents
(Foti et al., 2011), and younger youth (ages 8–13) with depressive
symptoms (Bress et al., 2012), have exhibited reduced FN amplitude in
response to monetary rewards and performance feedback, indicating a
reduced response to reward. The FN has also been found to pro-
spectively predict onset of MDD in adolescent girls (Bress et al., 2013).
These findings suggest that ERP indices may be useful neural markers of
alterations in emotional processing associated with depression.
Abnormalities in interoception occur in depression. These have been
linked to negatively biased predictive coding that results in afferent
interoceptive information being interpreted in a manner consonant
with depressive beliefs (Paulus and Stein, 2010). A similarly Bayesian
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proposal suggests that top-down control of physiological states by ac-
tive prediction, and the modification of these internal models by in-
teroceptively sensed prediction errors is inefficient and energetically
costly in the depressed state (Barrett et al., 2016). Another perspective
combines the multiple abnormalities of autonomic, neuroendocrine and
immune function with abnormalities of interoceptive brain structures
into a general Interoceptive Dysfunction model of depression (Harshaw,
2015). Although full consideration of abnormal interoception in de-
pression is beyond the scope of this review, the plethora of somatic
symptoms makes it clear that the intreroceptive sense of self, along with
self-referent cognitions becomes distorted and negatively biased in
depression.
Another factor in understanding how physiological indices are al-
tered in depression is the impact of anxiety or the experience of trau-
matic stress, as depression and anxiety have high rates of co-morbidity
and depressed individuals are more likely to have experienced trau-
matic stress. Anxiety and traumatic stress are also associated with al-
terations in physiological responses.
12.4.2. Trauma and stress related disorders
Physiological disturbances are hallmarks of trauma-, fear-, and an-
xiety disorders. One of the key features of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) is heightened emotional and physiological reactivity to
reminders of traumatic events that occurred in the past. Therefore,
measuring physiological responses such as changes in heart rate (HR),
skin conductance (SC), and startle response when presented with
trauma-related stimuli offers the potential for objective assessment of
PTSD symptoms (Jovanovic et al., 2017; Orr et al., 2002; Pole, 2007).
One of the earliest psychophysiological methods used a script-driven
imagery procedure, in which a traumatic event is transcribed and
played back to the patient while physiological reactivity is measured
(Lang, 1978; Pitman et al., 1987). Among trauma survivors, those with
PTSD exhibit a stronger HR and SC response to trauma scripts than
those without PTSD (Orr et al., 1997; Pitman et al., 1987; Shalev et al.,
1993). A recent meta-analysis of earlier studies (Pineles et al., 2013)
confirmed that psychophysiological responses to trauma scripts were
predictive of PTSD diagnosis and were stable across time (Bauer et al.,
2013). In recent studies, virtual reality (VR) has been used as a platform
to present trauma stimuli, providing a more immersive environment. A
study of active duty soldiers observed increased HR responses to VR
scenes in those with PTSD symptoms relative to non-symptomatic sol-
diers (Costanzo et al., 2014). With the advancement of smartphone and
similar devices, SC or HR can be recorded continuously during a trauma
reminder using mobile applications. These new technological advances
allow for low-burden measures of psychophysiology without need for
specialized training (Hinrichs et al., 2017).
Startle responses can be measured using electromyograph (EMG)
recordings of the eyeblink muscle contraction in response to loud
sounds. Such startle responses can then be modulated by emotional
contexts (Davis, 1992; Lang et al., 2000). For example, startle can be
reliably used as a measure of fear conditioned responses in humans
(Jovanovic et al., 2005). Studies in PTSD have shown that fear-po-
tentiated startle can be dysregulated in PTSD (Jovanovic et al., 2010;
Pole et al., 2003), as well as panic and other anxiety disorders (Duits
et al., 2015; Lissek et al., 2008). Accompanying replicated measures of
physiological hyperarousal, patients with PTSD show elevated scores on
the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Peterson and Reiss, 1987) a self-report
questionnaire assessing fear of sensations associated with physiological
arousal (Wald and Taylor, 2008). Additionally, in such patients, inter-
oceptive exposure therapy can precipitate trauma memories (Wald and
Taylor, 2008).
12.4.3. Interoception in other psychiatric disorders
The above examples are representative, but by no means exhaust
the range of neuropsychiatric as well as general medical conditions in
which a peripheral or central physiological abnormality manifests as
emotional dysregulation and interoceptive abnormalities (Khalsa et al.,
2018). Heightened interoceptive sensitivity has been widely docu-
mented in patients with panic disorder who show augmented inter-
oceptive sensitivity whether measured by the ASI or by heartbeat de-
tection tests (Domschke et al., 2010; Limmer et al., 2015; Yoris et al.,
2015). Moreover, interoceptive conditioning is implicated in the
etiology of panic disorder (De Cort et al., 2017) and interoceptive ex-
posure therapy is employed in its treatment (Boettcher et al., 2016).
Interoceptive feelings are the primary positive and negative reinforcers
perpetuating substance use disorders (Paulus and Stewart, 2014). In-
teroceptive abnormalities are noted in psychoses (Brosey and
Woodward, 2017), obsessive–compulsive disorders (Yoris et al., 2017)
and eating disorders (Jenkinson et al., 2018). Heightened interoceptive
sensitivity may also characterize the euphoric manic state or the emo-
tional lability of borderline personality disorder. In contrast, dis-
connection from interoceptive feelings may occur in autism spectrum
disorders (Quattrocki and Friston, 2014) and with the anhedonia ac-
companying many neuropsychiatric disorders (Harshaw, 2015). Yet
different forms of interoceptive disconnection may contribute to the
lack of empathy in antisocial personality disorder (Nentjes et al., 2013),
in experiences of dissociation and depersonalization and in states of
delirium or prefrontal trauma. It has even been suggested that impaired
interoception may be an endophenotype predisposing individuals to a
wide variety of psychopathology (Murphy et al., 2017). And deficits at
the level of interoceptive predictions and processing of prediction error
has similarly been proposed to underlie many neuropsychiatric symp-
toms (Khalsa et al., 2018; Seth and Friston, 2016).
13. A linguistic approach
13.1. An expanded definition of “feeling” and “emotion”
With this understanding of the current state of research related to
physiology and emotions as a backdrop, our team was specifically
tasked to review the language that people use to express feelings related
to physiological processes. Within the realm of affective research,
confusion arises over the fact that some feelings are a component/
constituent of emotional responses. For example, fear as an emotion
consists of a continuum of automatically activated defense behaviors
(Kozlowska et al., 2015) that co-occur along with “feelings of fear”.
Consequently, the term feeling is often used incorrectly as a synonym
for emotion and vice versa (LeDoux, 2015; Munezero et al., 2014). But
feelings are not emotions per se (LeDoux, 2015) which tend to be more
complex (Fontaine et al., 2007), and feelings are not limited to those
that co-occur with specific emotions. Rather, feelings encompass a wide
range of important mental experiences such as those signifying phy-
siological need (e.g., hunger), tissue injury (e.g., pain), general level of
functioning (e.g., well-being) or the dynamics of social interactions
(e.g., gratitude) (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Additional challenges
relate to the fact that feelings are not consistently defined, and that our
definitions for these terms can evolve over time (Tissari, 2016).
Moreover, while some feelings may be universally experienced across
cultures (e.g., hunger, pain, cold, fatigue, etc.), other feelings are un-
derstood to be culturally constructed such as gratitude (Boiger and
Mesquita, 2012) and optimism (Joshi and Carter, 2013).
As a result, the Human Affectome Project taskforce agreed that any
attempt to create a linguistic inventory of articulated feelings would
need to first define feelings in a manner that can help us understand the
full range of terms to be considered. Such an analysis must then be
undertaken with an acute awareness that variations in terminology are
going to exist in day-to-day usage, between languages, and across cul-
tures. So, a definition for feelings was developed as part of the project.
A small task team within the larger effort reviewed the literature to
create a definition for feelings that could serve as a starting point. The
task team produced a first draft and shared it with the entire taskforce
of nearly 200 researchers, feedback/input was gathered, and then it
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was refined, redistributed and the process iterated several times to
achieve broad consensus within the group. The resulting definition is as
follows.
A “feeling” is a fundamental construct in the behavioral and neu-
robiological sciences encompassing a wide range of mental processes
and individual experiences, many of which relate to homeostatic as-
pects of survival and life regulation (Buck, 1985; Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013; LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp, 2010; Strigo and Craig,
2016). Feeling is a perception/appraisal or mental representation that
emerges from physiological/bodily states (Damasio and Carvalho,
2013; LeDoux, 2012; Nummenmaa et al., 2014), processes inside (e.g.,
psychological processes) and outside the central nervous system, and/
or environmental circumstances. However, the full range of feelings is
diverse as they can emerge from emotions (Buck, 1985; Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp, 2010), levels of arousal, actions (Bernroider
and Panksepp, 2011; Gardiner, 2015), hedonics (pleasure and pain
(Buck, 1985; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp,
2010), drives (Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011), cognitions (including per-
ceptions/appraisals of self; Ellemers, 2012; Frewen et al., 2013;
Northoff et al., 2009), motives (Higgins and Pittman, 2008), social in-
teractions (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Gilam and Hendler, 2016;
LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp, 2010) and both reflective (Holland and
Kensinger, 2010) and anticipatory perspectives (Buck, 1985; Miloyan
and Suddendorf, 2015).
The duration of feelings can vary considerably. They are often re-
presented in language (Kircanski et al., 2012), although they can
sometimes be difficult to recognize and verbalize, and some feelings can
be influenced/shaped by culture (Immordino-Yang et al., 2014). Feel-
ings that are adaptive in nature (Izard, 2007; Strigo and Craig, 2016)
serve as a response to help an individual interpret, detect changes in,
and make sense of their circumstances at any given point in time. This
includes homeostatic feelings that influence other physiological/body
states, other mental states, emotions, motives, actions and behaviors in
support of adaptation and well-being (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013;
Strigo and Craig, 2016). However, some feelings can be maladaptive in
nature and may actually compete and/or interfere with goal-directed
behavior.
A “feeling” is not a synonym for the term “emotion”. There is
standing debate between researchers who posit that discrete emotion
categories correspond to distinct brain regions (Izard, 2010) and those
who argue that discrete emotion categories are constructed of gen-
eralized brain networks that are not specific to those categories
(Lindquist et al., 2012). However, both groups acknowledge that in
many instances feelings are a discernable component/constituent of an
emotional response (which tends to more complex).
Using this definition of feelings as a starting point, the linguistics
task team then undertook a formal linguistic analysis and ultimately
proposed nine broad categories of feelings (i.e., Physiological or Bodily
states, Attraction and Repulsion, Attention, Social, Actions and
Prospects, Hedonics, Anger, General Wellbeing, and “Other”).
13.2. What new avenues in affective neuroscience might physiological
feeling words suggest?
Physiological feelings (ad-hoc categorization shown in Table 1, full
list in Supplementary Materials) were described as “feelings related to
specific physiological/bodily states (e.g., hungry, warm, nauseous) in-
cluding feelings that relate to the current status of mental function (e.g.,
dizzy, forgetful, etc.) and feelings related to energy levels (e.g. vital,
tired)”. Not surprisingly, many of the words assigned to this category
reflect interoceptive processes. Although the category of “Internal
Bodily” in Table 1 refers specifically to interoceptive sensations, it is
notable that words in other categories of feelings created by this ad-hoc
grouping may also refer directly or indirectly to interoceptive sensation.
This is particularly the case for the categories of “Energy” and “Overall
Health”. In fact, when asked how we are feeling, the typical response
will incorporate words reflecting the summation and integration of
information from numerous interoceptive sources many of which op-
erate well below the level of conscious awareness. This is especially
apparent when describing dysphoric states for which many have noted
the similarity between terms reflecting mood (e.g., “depressed”), phy-
sical malaise or sickness (“not well”) and general energy (e.g., “dragged
out”). The source of this similarity might be an in-common physiolo-
gical process (e.g., acute phase of the innate immune response) or the
similarity of expressed feelings may represent a final common pathway
by which diverse types of homeostatic imbalance are perceived. A
major difficulty for the neurophysiological study of interoception will
be this non-specificity and difficulty in identifying dedicated neural
pathways or labeled lines reflecting specific homeostatic processes (as
can be done for exteroceptive input). And yet, we have little doubt,
both experientially and scientifically, that how we feel reflects “some-
thing going on inside”. It is possible that a linguistic approach, com-
bined with machine learning could do better at identifying the phy-
siological source of the various inputs to the verbal output given when
asked “how do you feel”. It is also possible that the words for feeling
Table 1
One representative parsing of physiological feeling words.
Category Subcategory
Drives Air
Food
Sex
Water
Energy Rest
other
Intoxication
Overall health General
Mental health
Muscular
Physical comfort
Sexual
Strength
Age
Internal bodily Moisture
Balance
Mobility/flexibility
General
Hair
Head
Heart
Muscular
Posture
Pregnancy
Skin (cleanliness)
Skin (color)
Skin (form)
Stomach/bowel
Vision
Weight
Other
Sensation (external stimulus) Moisture
Temperature (cold)
Temperature (hot)
General
Skin
External challenge response Body temperature
Mental clarity
Pain
Skin
Nerves
Response to internal emotion Mental clarity
Nerves
Skin
Skin (color)
General
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states more precisely representing physiological inputs to subjective
experience exist in languages other than English or even in non-scien-
tific, traditional systems of bodily attunement (e.g., “energy fields” and
the like). In any case, finding ways to measure, through verbal self-
report, the activity of our internal milieu presents a unique challenge to
neuroscientists quite unlike the relative ease of verbally tapping our
experience of the exteroceptive senses.
13.3. Interactions with other affectome reviews
As the putative basis of experienced feelings, the actual physiolo-
gical state of the body along with centrally generated (predicted) per-
ipheral states play a key role in the other feeling states, not specifically
identified as interoceptive, that are the foci of Human Affectome Project
reviews, viz. feelings of Attraction and Repulsion, of Attention, Social
Feelings, Actions and Prospects, Hedonics, Anger, and General
Wellbeing. Drawing upon our own subjective experiences, it is not
difficult to identify the physical sensations associated with each of the
above. Moreover, in some cases, these other domains are associated
with distinct visceral states (e.g., social disgust). One fruitful way to
conceptualize the role of intreroceptive feelings in each of the above
emotional domains is to speculate as to their role in advancing the
adaptive value of each domain over evolutionary time. Such roles, of
course, extend back well past the origins of hominids and involve the
presumed basic adaptive function of feelings in all higher organisms as
markers for the salience of stimuli to survival and reproduction. For
example: the physical manifestations of attraction guide us to sources of
food and mates; repulsion protects us from toxins and disease; attention
requires the physically aroused state of vigilance; social emotions rely
upon our gut feelings of what is advantageous behavior (e.g., Damasio's
somatic markers); hedonics utilize physically experienced reinforce-
ment in promoting pursuit of the requirements for survival; anger
mobilizes physiology for defense and competition; and feelings of
wellbeing represent a summation of interoceptive sensations signaling
different degrees of homeostatic balance and imbalance.
14. Conclusions
We have now explored the physiology of emotion from many per-
spectives including theoretical, evolutionary, anatomical, neurophy-
siological, interoceptive, autonomic, endocrine, immunological, re-
ward, consciousness, regulatory, developmental and neuropsychiatric
and linguistic viewpoints. Thematically we have focused on one way in
which peripheral and central physiology influences subjective emo-
tional experience, viz. interoception. The literature we have reviewed
suggests that changes toward and away from homeostasis, not only
within the autonomic nervous system but in all systems of the body
(e.g., metabolic, cardiovascular, immune) contribute interoceptive in-
formation to the CNS. The integrated output of multiple physiological
systems may provide highly complex inputs to central mechanisms that
produce the conscious experience of feelings, moods and emotions. And
such inputs may be modified by efferent signals at each level of the
neuraxis. Thus, the many physiological influences on emotion may
acquire specificity only when integrated with one another at the level of
the brainstem or forebrain. We have also touched upon the notion of the
Bayesian brain which suggests that this afferent flow of interoceptive
information can be reversed such that predictions of emotional pro-
cesses influence not only the perception of physiological change (e.g.,
as feelings) but also peripheral physiology itself (Barrett and Simmons,
2015; Seth, 2013; Seth and Friston, 2016). Clearly this is just a sampling
– an effort to whet the appetite of new generations of psychologists and
neuroscientists to consider the biology of emotion as a possible focus of
their research. Current efforts to conceptualize the fundamental ele-
ments of human of emotion continue to invoke the tensions articulated
over a century ago by the contrasting James–Lange (bottom-up) and
Cannon–Bard (top-down) viewpoints. Discoveries over this period,
however, have clearly revealed deep truths in both viewpoints. At the
same time, new findings extend sources of emotion both further
“downward” to the level of genes and their epigenetic modification,
molecules and cells of the immune system and gut, and further “up-
ward” to the level of neuronally instantiated cortical simulations that
can predict and even prepare the physiological state of the body before
it manifests. Of equal importance is the emerging view that, rather than
being controller and “slave”, central and peripheral physiologies op-
erate as a unified system with bidirectional flow of materials, energy
and information. An emergent property of this system may be no less
than the feelings of being a unified self – both as a physical body and as
an entity that experiences feelings and emotions. This raises the ques-
tion, so well articulated and explored by Antonio Damasio and others,
as to the relationship between these emergent somatic feelings of self-
hood and human consciousness (Damasio, 2010).
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